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FORCING PROTECTION ON CHILDREN 
AND THEffi PARENTS: THE IMPACT 
OF WYMAN v. JAMES 
Robert A. Burt* 
THE striking significance of Wyman v. ]ames1 does not lie in the Supreme Court's resolution of the immediate controversy be-
tween the parties. Whether or not the Court had required welfare 
caseworkers to obtain search warrants before payments could be 
terminated for AFDC recipients who refused to permit home visits, 
it seemed likely that welfare practices would be hardly affected.2 
Wyman's special importance comes rather from what it symbolizes 
and foretells. Mrs. James' resistance to her welfare caseworker's home 
visit challenged three increasingly important government claims to 
power. First, Mrs. James claimed privacy of her home from govern-
ment intrusion in a time of increasing government capacity and 
apparent willingness to derogate from individual privacy.3 Second, 
Mrs. James challenged the government's insistence that derogation of 
her privacy was the price of receiving public funds, in a time of wide-
spread public dependence on government largesse, increasingly ac-
companied by an entangling web of consequential obligations.4 
Third, Mrs. James claimed authority to define her own needs among 
the various types of welfare assistance available. But the government 
insisted that it knew better, as it increasingly claims when forcing 
assistance on other unwilling recipients-whether they be the "men-
tally ill," children in "moral danger" as evidenced by their conduct, 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1960, Princeton Uni-
versity; M.A. 1962, Oxford University; LL.B. 1964, Yale University.-Ed. 
1. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
2, The three-judge court, which the Supreme Court reversed, had imposed a 
warrant requirement, but the warrant would issue on a showing less demanding 
than criminal "probable cause," and no warrant would be required if the welfare 
recipient consented to the home visit. James v. Goldberg, 303 F. Supp. 935, 943-44 
(S.D.N.Y. 1969). If the Supreme Court had affirmed this judgment, it is unlikely 
that more stringent conditions would have been imposed on the warrant require-
ment and, in any event, it would have been wrong for the Court to do so. See text 
following note 141 infra. With these permissive conditions-and particularly with 
the possibility for waiver by individual welfare recipients-it seems unlikely either 
that many welfare recipients would bring court challenges or that many challenges 
would succeed. See Handler & Hollingsworth, Stigma, Privacy, and Other A.ttitudes 
of Welfare Recipients, 22 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1, 9-13 (1969). 
3. See, e.g., A. MII.LER, THE AssAULT ON PRIVACY (1971). 
4. See, e.g., R. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY (1970); Reich, The New Prop-
erty, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
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children who are "neglected or abused" as evidenced by their par-
ents' conduct, narcotics users, or public alcoholics.I' 
The Supreme Court refused to honor any of Mrs. James' claims. 
It would be wrong to construe that refusal as a pronouncement that 
none of the more general problems resounding from her claims 
deserves judicial attention or is amenable to judicial remedies. But 
the Wyman decision quite obviously means that a six-member major-
ity of the Court was not sufficiently aroused by any of these problems, 
or sufficiently persuaded that the Court should now address them, 
that it wanted to seize the opportunity that Mrs. James offered. 6 And 
it can readily be argued that this opportunity could have been 
seized precisely because imposing a warrant requirement on welfare 
home visits would vindicate the symbolic values claimed by Mrs. 
James without adding any significant burden to welfare administra-
tion. Thus, the Court's failure to do battle for the claims that Mrs. 
James invoked might appear to be a particularly telling portent of 
judicial reluctance to address these problems. 
Viewed narrowly, the result in Wyman is not unreasonable. The 
welfare caseworker had apparently been quite solicitous of Mrs. 
James' convenience in setting an advance date for her visit;7 and 
there is clearly a sensible governmental interest in assuring that its 
funds-whether in welfare grants or in service and supply contracts 
-are spent for the purposes it intended.8 But it is difficult, and 
ultimately wrong, for the Court to have viewed its decision thus 
narrowly. A warrant requirement, if properly designed, need not 
have disabled the government from pursuing its legitimate ends. 
It would, however, have signified judicial skepticism of the general 
reach of the governmental powers asserted, and would have an-
nounced the Court's determination to use its remedies, however 
limited, to assure that the legitimate government interests claimed 
are not stretched beyond their proper bounds. The Wyman Court's 
refusal to be skeptical of the government's claims is ultimately the 
most troubling and most portentous aspect of the case. 
This Article will focus on one of the concerns implicated in 
5. See, e.g., N. MORRIS&: G. HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE 'IO CRL'-IB 
CONTROL ch. I (1969). 
6. Justice Blackmun wrote the majority opinion, his maiden effort, for the Court. 
Justices Douglas, Marshall, and Brennan dissented. 400 U.S. at 326, 338. 
7. 400 U.S. at 313. 
8. The Court made this point in a peculiarly provocative manner: "One who 
dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know 
how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work. The public, when it is the 
provider, rightly expects the same." 400 U.S. at 319. 
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Wyman: the government's power to force assistance for the protec-
tion of children, when they or their parents are unwilling to accept 
that assistance. The state's protective purposes in insisting that Mrs. 
James accept its assistance or suffer serious loss of benefits played 
an important role in the Wyman decision. Only a few years ago, in 
In re Gault,9 the Court refused to defer to a state's similarly benef-
icent motives when it was asked to withhold the imposition of 
procedural safeguards in juvenile deliquency proceedings. Wyman 
does not overrule Gault. But the suppositions underlying the two 
cases are vastly different. In order to assess the prospects of Gault's 
growth even in the juvenile court context, and the probable judicial 
attitude to other governmental exercises of benevolent coercive 
powers, it is instructive to set the underlying premises of the two 
cases side by side. 
I. DEFERRING TO GOVERNMENTAL BENEVOLENCE IN PROTECTING 
PARENTS AND CHILDREN: WYMAN AND GAULT CONTRASTED 
Barbara James was not a wholly unwilling recipient of govern-
ment assistance. She wanted welfare funds. She did not, however, 
want those funds accompanied by home visits from her caseworker-
Mrs. James' "friend in need," as the Court rather gratuitously iden-
tified her.10 But the Court was willing to insist that Mrs. James ac-
cept the unwanted as well as the wanted assistance. To justify this 
position, the Court repeatedly invoked the government's "bene-
volent motivation" in offering the unwanted assistance. The Court 
noted that the "rehabilitative" aspect of the "caseworker's posture 
in the home visit" in significant part prompted its conclusion that 
there was no "search in the traditional criminal law context," so 
that the fourth amendment warrant requirement could be deemed 
wholly irrelevant to the case.11 Although this portion of the opinion 
is puzzlingly obscure, the Court comes close to resurrecting "civil-
criminal" labeling as a technique for applying the fourth amend-
ment, and to manipulating those labels by reference to the apparent 
beneficence of the government's purpose.12 Similarly, in those parts 
of the Court's opinion in which it is assumed, for purposes of argu-
9. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
IO. The Court said: "The caseworker is not a sleuth but rather, we trust, is a 
friend in need." 400 U.S. at 323. 
11. 400 U.S. at 317. 
12. Compare Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967), discussed 
in text following note 128 infra. Justice White, the author of the Camara opinion, 
refused to join in this portion of the Wyman Court's opinion, though he concurred 
in all else. 400 U.S. at 326. 
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ment, that the welfare home visit "does possess some of the char-
acteristics of a search in the traditional sense,"13 the government's 
protective purpose-both for Mrs. James and for her child, for 
whose well-being "the [welfare] worker has profound responsibil-
ity"14-played a central role for the Court in establishing the "rea-
sonableness" of the search. 
Although the ascription of benevolent motive was important to 
the Court in justifying the challenged government action, the Court 
did not think it necessary to cut beneath the surface of the govern-
ment's allegations. This is not to say that the Court should or could 
have suspected that the welfare agency was secretly harboring evil 
motives. The Court could accept that the agency made its benevolent 
protestations in good faith, and yet might still doubt that there was 
any likelihood that those beneficent motives would be realized in 
practice. On the face of the record in Wyman, there was good reason 
for the Court to doubt that any of the beneficent purposes of the 
welfare home visit were likely to be accomplished. It borders on the 
absurd to think that any friendly assistance that might be offered by 
the caseworker would be accepted in a benevolent spirit by the wel-
fare recipient, Mrs. James, who--it must be re-emphasized-refused 
to accept a visit from this "friend in need." Indeed, the Court chose 
to notice some clues about Mrs. James' attitude that it derived from 
case records appended to the state's brief, alleging that Mrs. James 
was "belligerent" and "evasive."15 It was doubtful taste or judicial 
propriety for the Court thus to slur Mrs. James' character without 
giving her an opportunity to test the bases for these conclusions in 
open court. Nevertheless, since the Court was willing to give some 
credence to these caseworkers' allegations, it should have realized 
that the accompanying allegation by the welfare caseworkers must 
resound hollowly, that one purpose of their proposed visit was to 
offer helpful services to Mrs. James. The Court did not see the need 
to ask whether the kinds of services which the caseworkers intended 
to provide would require the willing cooperation of the recipient.16 
13. 400 U.S. at 318. 
14. The Court stated: 
The visit is not one by police or uniformed authority. It is made by a caseworker 
of some training whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the 
prosecution, of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility. 
400 U.S. at 322-23 (footnote omitted). 
15. 400 U.S. at 322 n.9. 
16. In theory, the caseworker's visit is intended both to provide some direct ser-
vices and to determine whether the welfare recipient needs additional services. This 
theory follows from 
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If this question had been pursued and if the answer were returned 
that such cooperation would be necessary, then the beneficent face 
of this aspect of the visit would vanish, taking with it an important 
part of the Court's articulated basis for refusing to view this visit as 
an adversarial search. 
It might nonetheless be argued that the welfare of Mrs. James' 
son, Maurice, was at stake and that he would be protected by this 
visit. Such an argument would subordinate Mrs. James' privacy 
claims to the protective interests of her son.17 On this matter, the 
Court saw fit to mention that according to the caseworker records: 
"[A]ll was not always well with the infant Maurice (skull fracture, a 
dent in the head, a possible rat bite)."18 But though it might be 
assumed that the purpose of the home visit was beneficent toward 
Maurice, in fact the caseworker did not ask to see Maurice in the 
notification provided to Mrs. Jam.es to arrange the visit. And there 
the 1962 amendments to the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 601-05 (1964)], and 
earlier ones in 1956 [42 U.S.C. §§ 301-03 (1964)], announc[ing] the new philosophy 
of encouraging the states to institute or expand a variety of service programs: 
counseling, training, vocational rehabilitation, home management, and so on. 
Handler &: Rosenheim, Privacy in Welfare: Public Assistance and Juvenile Justice, 31 
LA.w &: CoNTEMP. PROB. 377, 392-93 (1966). 
A recent survey of AFDC recipients in Wisconsin indicates both the kinds of ser-
vices typically offered and the attitudes with which those services were regarded: 
Our overall finding was that very little social service activity goes on. This follows 
from the pattern of caseworker visits. Since the caseworkers visit the clients so 
infrequently and for such short periods of time, there is of necessity very little 
supportive service work or regulation of clients' lives. According to client re-
sponses, once budgets were established there were few basic changes and few re-
quests for special grants for extra needs, and there was practically no supervision 
of how the client spent the money. In the other social service areas caseworkers 
tended to stay away from troublesome issues, and, with the exception of the 
health area where they did help clients use Medicaid, they offered little concrete 
assistance. Within that context of very low social service activity, most clients 
were not particularly bothered or upset. · 
While there was little overall dissatisfaction with social services activity, there 
were differences among specific areas. Whereas less than IO percent were bothered 
or annoyed about discussions of children and health, more than one out of four 
were bothered by discussions about home care and social life. Clients' annoyance 
in these areas did not affect overall attitudes very much, since these discussions 
occurred rather infrequently. Feelings of coercion, of being forced to follow the 
caseworker's advice, varied with how immediately useful the client felt the case-
worker services were: ,Vhen the caseworkers offered concrete tangible help-in 
health matters, for example-clients said that they had to follow the caseworker's 
advice. In discussions about home care and social life most clients felt no coercion. 
Handler &: Hollingsworth, supra note 2, at IO. 
17. The W1man Court embraced this argument: 
The public's interest ••• is protection and aid for the dependent child whose fam-
ily requires such aid for that child. The focus is on the child and, further, it is on 
the child who is dependent. There is no more worthy object of the public's con-
cern. The dependent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would 
we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a position secondary 
to what the mother claims as her rights. 
400 U.S. at 318. 
18. 400 U.S. at 322 n.9. 
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was no assurance that the caseworker intended to locate the child if 
he were not at home on the day of the visit.19 
The Wyman Court simply did not think it important to pursue 
the question whether any of the arguably beneficent purposes of the 
coerced home visit had any probability of accomplishment. But that 
question must be the core of judicial inquiry if there is to be any 
hope of civilizing the wide-ranging impositions of governmentally 
coerced help to unwilling recipients. 
The insistence with which the Wyman Court avoided this ques-
tion is revealed in startling boldness by the following footnote in the 
opinion: 
11. The amicus brief submitted on behalf of the Social Services 
Employees Union Local 371, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, the bargaining 
representative for the social service staff employed in the New York 
City Department of Social Services, recites that "caseworkers are either 
badly trained or untrained" and that "[g]enerally, a caseworker is not 
only poorly trained, but also young and inexperienced .... " Despite 
this astonishing description20 by the union of the lack of qualification 
of its own members for the work they are employed to do, we must 
assume that the caseworker possesses at least some qualifications and 
some dedication to duty.21 
Why must the Court assume this? What might follow if the Court 
chose to assume the contrary? Might not the contrary assumption 
compel the Court to demand greater assurance, if only by imposing 
a minimally burdensome warrant requirement, that the benefits 
claimed to be bestowed by these caseworkers will in fact be visited 
upon the unwilling recipients? Why should the Court be reluctant 
to demand such assurance? 
It is striking to compare the Wyman footnote eleven with the 
directly opposing view regarding the uses of judicial power revealed 
in footnote fourteen of the Gault opinion, citing studies which 
showed the scant training of juvenile court judges.22 The Gault 
19. See 400 U.S. at 342 (Justice Marshall, dissenting); 303 F. Supp. at 943 (majority 
opinion of the three-judge court below). 
20. Astonishing because of its honesty? Astonishing because it is not believable? 
Astonishing because it is de rigeur for a labor union to turn the same blind eye to 
this reality that the Court resolutely turns? 
21. 400 U.S. at 322-23 n.11. 
22. The Gault Court's footnote fourteen was this: 
The number of Juvenile Judges as of 1964 is listed as 2,987, of whom 213 are full-
time Juvenile Court judges. [Citing National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, 
Directory and Manual (1964) at 305.] The National Crime Commission Report 
indicates that half of these judges have no undergraduate degree, a fifth have no 
college education at all, a fifth are not members of the bar, and three-quarters 
devote less than one-quarter of their time to juvenile matters. See also McCune, 
Profile of the Nation's Juvenile Court Judges (monograph, George Washington Uni-
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Court found these studies relevant to the likelihood that the juvenile 
courts' promises of treatment and rehabilitation would be kept. But 
both Gault and Wyman only implicitly address the propriety or 
utility of the judicial role each undertook. Thus nothing necessarily 
dispositive is said by pointing out that the underlying suppositions 
of Wyman are directly antithetical to those of Gault. It must be 
reiterated, however, that to the extent that Wyman relies on the 
specially benevolent character of the governmental power at issue in 
order to reach a result it could not otherwise rationally justify,23 the 
Court cannot with intellectual integrity so blandly overlook sugges-
tions that this presumed special character is a chimera. 
The record in Wyman did not illuminate for the Court the 
workings and quality of the New York City welfare administration. 
Indeed, at several points in the Court's opinion, Justice Blackmun 
notes the skimpiness of the record.24 Although the Gault record was 
no more extensive,25 it might be argued that the context of juvenile 
court proceedings, with its obvious analogues in criminal proceed-
ings, made the Gault Court more comfortable at intervening. Wel-
fare practices and problems, however, are less familiar to the Court. 
Unless some such distinction is drawn, Wyman suggests that in 
juvenile court matters the current Court will refuse to draw the 
implications of Gault beyond those proceedings in which a juvenile 
is charged with an offense that would be a crime if committed by 
an adult.26 Wyman might thus imply that the important "status" 
versity, Center for the Behavioral Sciences, 1965), which is a detailed statistical 
study of Juvenile Court Judges, and indicates additionally that about a quarter 
of these judges have no law school training at all. About one-third of all judges 
have no probation and social work staff available to them; between eighty and 
ninety percent have no available psychologist or psychiatrist. Ibid. It has been 
observed that while "good will, compassion, and similar virtues are ..• admirably 
prevalent throughout the system ••. expertise, the keystone of the whole venture, 
is lacking." Harvard Law Review Note, p. 809. In 1965, over 697,000 delinquency 
cases (excluding traffic) were disposed of in these courts, involving some 601,000 
children, or 2% of all children between 10 and 17. Juvenile Court Statistics-1965, 
Children's Bureau Statistical Series No. 85 (1966), p. 2. 
387 U.S. at 14-15 n.14. 
23. See text accompanying notes 11-14 supra. 
24. 400 U.S. at 313, 320 n.8, 321. 
25. See the separate opinions in that case of Justice White, 387 U.S. at 64, and 
Justice Harlan, 387 U.S. at 76. 
26. Gerald Gault was charged in Arizona Juvenile Court with making an obscene 
phone call to a woman. For an adult, such conduct, if proved, would violate ARiz. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 13.377 (1956). See 387 U.S. at 8. The juvenile court judge in Gault did not 
think it necessary to decide whether he had jurisdiction over Gerald because of his 
alleged violation of an adult criminal statute (a "criminal" offense) or because that 
conduct in part indicated that Gerald was "habitually involved in immoral matters" 
(a "status" offense). 387 U.S. at 8-9. The Gault Court was similarly imprecise in its 
characterization when it stated: 
We consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to pro-
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jurisdiction of the juvenile court-such as commitment for "incor-
rigibility,"27 "habitually idl[ing] away [ one's] time,"28 or being a "per-
son in need of supervision"29-will remain undomesticated30 by the 
Court. Studies of juvenile court practice suggest that these special 
status commitments account for between one fourth and one half of 
the current cases.31 If it is easier for juvenile courts to dispose of such 
cases--because attorneys need not be involved, court hearings re-
quire less formality, and information regarding the juvenile is more 
easily available-then reliance on these status adjudications, which 
wholly overlap the "specific crime" jurisdictions, will become in-
creasingly attractive to juvenile courts. As a result, the procedural 
strictures of Gault, unless extended to status adjudications, will have 
a declining impact on the operations of juvenile courts. 
It may be that Gault should become increasingly irrelevant, 
particularly if some clear competing interest will be unduly compro-
mised by extending Gault's impact on the juvenile court. This is the 
premise of Chief Justice Burger's recent complaint that the Supreme 
ceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a "delin-
quent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that 
he may be committed to a state institution. 
387 U.S. at 13. Subsequently the Court, in extending to juvenile proceedings the rule 
that allegations must be proved by the criminal standard of "beyond reasonable doubt," 
described that holding as applicable to "the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is 
charged with an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult." In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 359 (1970). The Court did not make clear whether this descrip-
tion was meant to qualify the holding in Gault, whether this was a limitation restricted 
to the standard of proof question alone, or whether this description was no more than 
a description and would not limit the Court from extending the "reasonable doubt" 
standard in a future case to "noncriminal" juvenile delinquency proceedings. 
27. See, e.g., the Arizona statute involved in Gault: 
"Delinquent child" includes: 
(b) ·A child who, by reason of being incorrigible, wayward or habitually disobedient, 
is uncontrolled by his parent, guardian or custodian. 
ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-6 (1956), later amended, ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-201-9 
(Supp. 1970), cited at 387 U.S. 1, 9 n.6 (1967). See also Weiss, The Poor Kid, 9 DUQUESNE 
L. REv. 590, 605 (1971). 
28, See MICH. COMP. LAws, § 712A.2(d)(6) (1968). 
29. See N.Y. FAMILY CT. Ac:r, §§ 711-12, 742-45 (McKinney 1963). 
30. The phrase is Dean Paulsen's, The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile 
Court, 1967 SUP. CT. REv. 233. 
31. G. Mueller, M. Gage, and L. Kupperstein conclude that "juvenile status offenses 
(runaway, truancy, curfew violations, ungovernable)" constitute 22,8% of cases processed 
in 1965 by a representative sample of juvenile courts across the country. THE LEGAL 
NORMS OF DELINQUENCY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 14 (1969) [hereinafter MUELLER]. 
N. MoRRis &: G. HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 160, notes that in California in 1966 arrests 
for "'delinquent tendencies,' which include such behavior as incorrigibility, wayward-
ness, runaway and truancy" were 63% of all juvenile arrests, and they suggest generally 
that these juvenile status designations constitute about one half of the cases disposed 
of by juvenile courts. 
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Court has been captivated by the merely formal analogies between 
juvenile and ordinary criminal proceedings and that "the juvenile 
court system needs ... not more but less of the trappings of legal 
procedure and judicial formalism.''32 But the Chief Justice then 
immediately made clear that he reached this conclusion only by 
choosing to ignore whether juvenile courts can in fact perform their 
beneficent promises. "[M]uch of the judicial attitude manifested by 
the Court's ... holdings in this field," he said, "is really a protest 
against inadequate juvenile court staffs and facilities; we 'bum down 
the stable to get rid of the mice.' "33 Thus he articulated the same 
proposition put forward by footnote eleven of the Wyman opinion: 
inadequate government staff or facilities are not relevant to the 
Court's function in reviewing the exercise of governmental power 
based on purportedly benevolent purposes. The Chief Justice im-
plicitly rejects the suggestion that the Court is appropriately reacting 
to the inadequacies of benevolent-seeming agencies by imposing pro-
cedural stringencies that require agencies to make a compelling case 
before they can force anyone to accept their help. 
Undoubtedly, by requiring these procedures, some cases in which 
available treatment could have materially assisted the juvenile will 
be lost. But it seems equally clear that without vigorous partisan 
advocacy directed against imposed treatment, without clear standards 
of proof and precise formulations by juvenile court personnel of both 
the reasons for the imposition of treatment and the relation of the 
particular treatment envisioned to these reasons--without, that is, 
satisfying the procedural requirements that Gault and its progeny 
envision34-intervention is likely to be commanded in some cases in 
which it is not only useless but also (or, one might simply say, there-
fore) affirmatively harmful to the individual juveniles involved.35 No 
32. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Chief Justice Burger, dissenting). In this 
dissent from the Court's holding that the criminal standard of proof must apply in 
juvenile proceedings, the Chief Justice was joined by Justice Stewart, who wholly 
dissented alone in Gault. See 387 U.S. at 78. 
33. 397 U.S. at 376. A similar attitude appears in Justice Blackmun's recent opin-
ion, joined by three other Justices, in l\lcKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W. 4777 
(U.S. June 21, 1971): 
Of course there have been abuses [in the operations of juvenile courts] .••• 1\Te 
refrain from saying at this point that those abuses are of constitutional dimension. 
They relate to the lack of resources and of dedication rather than to inherent un-
fairness. 
39 U.S.L.W. at 4783 (emphasis added). McKeiver is discussed in notes 108 &: 110 infra. 
34. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970), discussed in note 26 supra. 
35. Compare, e.g., the conclusions reached, on the basis of an imaginatively con-
structed empirical study, that "what legal authorities now commonly <lo upon ap-
prehending a juvenile for his delinquent behavior is worse than not apprehending him 
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firm quantitative resolution of the relative costs of each alternative 
can be made. But the choice between the alternatives is inescapably 
before the Court. The central question that both Gault and Wyman 
appear to present is whether the Court should itself weigh these com-
peting advantages and resolve the issue, or whether it should defer 
to the judgments of some other agency, legislative or administrative. 
The two cases disagree on the answer to this question. 
In neither Gault nor Wyman did the Court see any pressing need 
to articulate and justify its view of judicial institutional capacities. 
No matter what distinctions are drawn between the cases, there is 
stark contrast in Wyman and Gault in their revealed judicial atti-
tudes toward government protection and benevolence as justification 
for coercing the acceptance of unwanted assistance. The two cases 
appear to express dramatically opposite views regarding the propriety 
of, and the necessary evidentiary basis for, judicial disbelief in the 
reality of such protection. It may be that Wyman, in welfare admin-
istration, and Gault, in juvenile court administration, will continue 
on separate paths and that the courts will simply refuse to acknowl-
edge and choose between their competing presuppositions. However, 
in a different context, which the Supreme Court has not yet reviewed, 
the necessity for choice cannot be avoided. That context is the pro-
cedures for the administration of child abuse and neglect laws. 
II. PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM THEIR PARENTS: 
WYMAN vs. GAULT 
Neither Gault nor Wyman obviously applies, one excluding the 
other, to child abuse and neglect laws. It might appear that criminal 
law analogues more closely track the purposes and impact of the 
abuse and neglect laws than the administration of welfare laws. Thus 
Gault beckons. But it might appear that the interests of parents 
subject to abuse or neglect law proceedings are more directly in 
conflict with the interests of their possibly maltreated children than 
in the administration of juvenile delinquency laws. Thus Wyman 
beckons. To determine which case should govern here, the questions 
which have been begged or resolved only implicitly in both Wyman 
and Gault must be brought into clearer focus. 
Criminal law procedures are considered inapplicable to child 
at all .... [A]pprehension itself encourages rather than deters further delinquency." 
Gold &: Williams, National Study of the Aftermath of Apprehension, 3 PRoSP.ECTUs 1, 3 
(1969). 
On socially imposed "negative identities" which become self-fulfilling prophecies 
for those labelled "delinquent," see, e.g., E. ERIKSON, CHILDHOOD AND SOCIETY 307-08 
(1950); id., INSIGHT AND RllSPONSIBILITY 97-98 (1964). 
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abuse and neglect laws in many states. In proceedings in which 
parents may be deprived of child custody for neglect or abuse (as 
opposed to criminal prosecution for such conduct), parents are not 
guaranteed the presence of counsel,36 no "presumption of parental 
innocence" effectively guarantees retention of custody by the parent 
prior to final adjudication of abuse or neglect,37 the burden of proof 
at trial is the civil "preponderance of the evidence" rather than the 
criminal standard,38 courts may rely on confidential information to 
determine the existence of neglect or abuse without giving confronta-
tion opportunities,39 and no "self-incrimination right" or fourth 
amendment "probable cause" requirement restrains courts from 
ordering pretrial physical or psychiatric examinations of parents or 
children to determine neglect or abuse.40 
Gault clearly invites testing the propriety of this civil procedure 
model. Particularly if one invokes the test for applying "criminal" 
or "civil" labels that the Court set out in Kennedy v. 111.endoza-
Martinez41 (but which Gault eschewed), the case for "criminalizing" 
36. See ILL. R.Ev. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-5 (Smith-Hurd 1971), which assures appointed 
counsel for a child but not for his parents in such proceedings; to the same effect are 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 29 (1965); MICH. COMP. LAws § 712A.17 (1968); N.Y. FAMILY 
CT. ACT § 249 (McKinney 1963); VA. CODE § 16.1-175 (1960). By contrast, California and 
'Wisconsin permit, though neither state requires, appointment of counsel for parents 
in abuse or neglect proceedings. See County of Alameda v. Espinoza, 243 Cal. App. 2d 
534, 52 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN. ch. 48, § 25(6) (1957). 
A survey of child neglect proceedings in one New York county found that parents 
were unrepresented by counsel in 76% of the cases, and that the presence of counsel 
at any stage of the proceeding appeared to have marked impact in favor of the parents. 
Note, Representation in Child-Neglect Cases: Are Parents Neglected?, 4 CoLUM. J. L. &: 
Soc. PRons. 230, 238, 241-44 (1968). 
37. In 1967-1968, the Family Courts in New York State disposed of 6347 child neglect 
petitions. Of those, 1759 children (or about 26%) were removed from their homes 
pending final disposition of the petitions (286 children-or 4.5% of the total-were 
removed from their homes before any neglect petition was filed, and the remainder 
were removed after a petition was filed). Of these 1759 children, approximately 44% 
remained in a "short-term care" detention facility for more than 90 days pending 
disposition of the neglect petition. See REPORT OF N.Y. STATE FAMILY COURT, 1967-68. 
See N.Y, FAMILY CT. ACT§§ 1021-28 (McKinney Supp. 1971), which provide for tempo-
rary home removal of children both with and without court orders. See also MASS. 
ANN. LAws ch. II9, § 39-B (Supp. 1970); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 712A.15 (1968), § 722.57I(a) 
(Supp. 1971); VA. CODE §§ 16.1-166, -194 (1960). 
38. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 26, 
§ 70-18(c) (1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1046(b){i) (McKinney 1963); WIS. STAT. ANN. 
ch. 48, § 25(3) (1957). 
39. See D.C. ConE ANN. § 11-1586(b) (1967); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 37, § 705-1(2) (Smith-
Hurd 1966); Mn. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-14 (1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 1047(b) 
(McKinney 1963). Other states do, however, provide full confrontation rights in these 
proceedings. See CAL. CIV. ConE § 4602 (West 1970); MASs. ANN. LAws ch. ll9, § 24 
(1965); VA. CODE § 16.1-162 (1960). 
40. See Mn. ANN. CODE art. 26, § 70-14(c) (1966); N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 251 (Mc-
Kinney 1963); VA. CODE § 16.1-190 (1960). 
41. 372 U.S. 144 (1963). 
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abuse and neglect statutes seems compelling. The Mendoza-Martinez 
questionnaire was this. First, is there an "affirmative disability or 
restraint"42 worked by these laws? To lose custody of one's child 
surely is that, whether viewed from the perspective of the parent 
who wants to keep his child or from that of the child who, however 
benightedly and however much precisely because he has been mal-
treated, wants to remain with his parent.43 Second, have such laws 
"historically been regarded as a punishment"?44 The punitive stigma 
of child abuse and neglect laws is considerable, again whether viewed 
from the parent's perspective or from that of the child, who may see 
his removal not as a product of court coercion directed against an 
unwilling parent, but-once again, often precisely because he has 
been maltreated-as a punishment inflicted on him by an omnipo-
tent parent who now deserts him.45 In response to the third inquiry 
of Mendoza-Martinez, the "traditional aims of punishment-retribu-
tion and deterrence"46 are obviously involved in the operation of 
these laws. Of the remaining Mendoza-Martinez questions, only one 
might be considered inapplicable here, that is, child removal for 
neglect or abuse does not necessarily turn on the parents' scienter.41 
Nonetheless, in practice it is clear that the courts' view of the exis-
tence of parental scienter is highly relevant to the severity of their 
response, and in particular to loss of custody as opposed to milder 
sanctions such as reprimands or impositions of protective services.48 
Finally, Mendoza-Martinez instructs courts to ask "whether an 
alternative purpose to which [the statute in question] may rationally 
be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned."49 Here, as noted 
earlier,50 seems the fail-safe proposition by which the courts might 
shake free of the criminal characterization. The purpose of these 
42. 372 U.S. at 168. 
43. See text accompanying note 76 infra. 
44. 372 U.S. at 168. 
45. See A. FREUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD 58-61 (1965). 
46. 372 U.S. at 168. 
47. 372 U.S. at 168. 
48. For example, the New York Family Court Act distinguishes between an "abused 
child" and a "neglected child" in part based on whether "injury" was inflicted on the 
child "by other than accidental means." N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr §§ l012(e), (f) (McKinney 
1963). Only for allegedly "abused" children, child-protective agencies must seek court 
approval either to return children to their homes pending court action on filed peti-
tions, or to dismiss filed petitions. N.Y. FAMILY CT. Acr §§ l026(a)(ii), 1033(b) (McKinney 
1963). See also D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN 5-6 (1970); Paulsen, The Legal 
Framework for Child Protection, 66 Couw:. L. REv. 679, 701-02 (1966). 
49. 372 U.S. at 168-69. 
50. See text accompanying note 17 supra. 
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laws, it might be argued, is not (or not so much) punishment of the 
parent but protection of the child. To recall the Court's formulation 
in Wyman: 
There is no more worthy object of the public's concern. The de-
pendent child's needs are paramount, and only with hesitancy would 
we relegate those needs, in the scale of comparative values, to a posi-
tion secondary to what the mother claims as her rights.isl 
But, if the statement in Mendoza-Martinez is to be taken at face 
value, the Court must ask whether the deprivation of the parental 
rights at issue in child neglect and abuse laws "appears excessive" in 
relation to the child-protective purposes of those laws. The calibra-
tion of cost/benefit is thus a judicial task. One might argue that 
Mendoza-Martinez was wrong in this regard; this is Wyman's implicit 
argument. But this argument is wrong. The need for an independent 
judicial evaluation arises because the criminal law analogue is so 
obviously close to the impact of neglect and abuse laws, and because 
the judiciary is charged by the tradition of the Constitution to deter-
mine for itself the application of the criminal procedure guarantees. 
How can such an evaluation proceed without asking whether the 
diminution of parental procedural rights is "excessive," both because 
such diminution is unnecessary to accomplish the precise protective 
purposes that the state might intend to pursue and because the pro-
tective services are in fact chimerical? The latter question in partic-
ular is an issue of "constitutional fact."52 
But though this recitation of the litany from Mendoza-Martinez 
does clearly support the proposition that courts must independently 
evaluate the reality of the protective purposes of these laws, this 
conclusion still begs a crucial question. It cannot be denied that 
some children found neglected or abused under the various state 
laws must for their welfare be removed from their parents. It is 
equally true that if the legislature, perhaps drawing from the ancient 
plagues visited on Egypt, provided that every tenth child on state 
census roles should be separated from his parents, some children who 
for their benefit should be removed would by chance selection in 
fact be removed. The sensitivity of the interests at stake would un-
doubtedly lead any court to declare this scheme irrational and, 
therefore, by minimal equal protection standards, unconstitutional.53 
No legislature has acted or, at least, has admitted to acting thus 
51. 400 U.S. at 318. See note 17 supra. 
52. Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964). 
53. Compare Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), discussed in text following 
note 68 infra. 
1272 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:1259 
randomly. In all contested cases of alleged abuse or neglect, state 
laws require a court to engage in individualized inquiry.54 Ideally, 
this legislative command should lead a court to delve deeply into the 
psychological dynamics of the family before it, and to formulate a 
precise diagnostic view of that family from which it is possible to 
make three central judgments: first, whether the child is suffering 
serious harm (though for severe physical injuries, this ground for 
psychological inquiry can be redundant); second, whether grave risks 
would attend removing the particular child from his otherwise harm-
ful family; and third, whether treatment was available that would 
respond to the psychology of this particular family. There is powerful 
support in the professional literature for the proposition that any 
judgment to remove a child from his parents that is not thus firmly 
based on a clear view of family and individual dynamics is a wholly 
random intervention.55 This professional view provides strong sup-
port for any judicial impulse to require closer, more detailed atten-
tion to the individual characteristics of the particular family allegedly 
requiring state intervention. For this purpose, constitutional "domes-
tication" of court procedures, by imposing the "criminal" label on 
these proceedings, is obviously attractive. 
But it would be a mistake for a court simply to adopt whole-
sale, via the Constitution, this professional view of the need for 
precise diagnostic formulations. This is not simply because a court 
should disbelieve professional claims to precision. In the hands of 
the most skilled practitioners, there can be compelling clarity and 
precision in the use of psychological diagnostic tools. Nor should a 
court withhold allegiance from these views simply because of the 
obvious dearth of such skilled practitioners, particularly in the low-
status, low-paying child-protective agencies. Rather, if imprecision is 
inherent in the discipline or in its application to child abuse and 
neglect cases, that is reason for a court to insist on greater precision 
through procedural strictures designed to approach the ultimately 
unattainable ideal. 
A court must, however, consider these factors as reasons to abstain 
from imposing procedural strictures because there is room for a 
quite reasonable, competing judgment that some strong pressure 
must be exerted to urge removal of children. Such pressure may be 
54. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 712A.ll, .12, .14 (1968). 
55. See generally J. BOWLBY, CHILD CARE AND THE GROWTH OF LOVE, esp. ch. 7 (2d 
ed. 1965); D. GIL, supra note 48, esp. ch. II; Steele &: Pollock, A Psychiatric Study of 
Parents Who Abuse Infants and Small Children, in THE BATIE.RED CHILD 103, 144 
(Helfer &: Kempe ed. 1968); Terr &: Watson, The Battered Child Rebrutalized: Ten 
Cases of Medical-Legal Confusion, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1432 (1968). 
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necessary precisely because of the diagnostic imprecision and low 
skill of state child-protective personnel, which can lead to ·wrongful 
withholding of state intervention. There may be reason to believe 
that state child-protective services, even operating under current, 
relatively lax procedures, do not intervene in families as often as 
would be desirable in order to protect children. 56 Professional un-
certainty, either from inherent diagnostic imprecision or from the 
imprecisions of unskilled personnel, can lead as readily to inaction 
as to excessive action. Moreover, the invisibility of most transactions 
between parent and child, particularly the preschool child, are in-
trinsic limiting factors on the possibility of any state intervention 
predicated on individualized inquiry, no matter how lax the stan-
dards of that inquiry.57 It is thus quite reasonable to assert that 
imposing added burdens on these proceedings is at least quixotic, if 
not harmful. But if there are "reasonable" arguments that a legisla-
ture can adduce to justify relaxed procedural standards for neglect 
and abuse laws, this fact merely recasts for the courts the basic 
question of the propriety of these relaxed procedures. Are those 
competing arguments "reasonable enough" to justify rejecting the 
relevance of the criminal law analogues to these laws? Must, instead, 
the competing legislative arguments be "compelling"? Or are these 
arguments so "reasonable" that they are "compelling"?58 
The paradoxical character of this inquiry-that is, the strong 
pulls both to reject and to accept the legislative judgment regarding 
the need for relaxed procedures in abuse and neglect laws-can be 
graphically seen in the experience of the New York State Legislature 
56. Compare the conclusion recently reached by the New York State Board of 
Social Welfare: 
The most serious deficiency in the New York City system of children's services is 
the low priority given to early identification of children in jeopardy or potential 
jeopardy and the failure to develop helping services for them and their families 
before serious and sometimes irreversible tragedies occur. 
N.Y. Times, May 16, 1971, § 1, at 57, col. I. 
57. Judge Nanette Dembitz of the New York City Family Court has stated: "In 
the absence of a reliable [parental] admission, it can only rarely be proved with a 
reasonable degree of certainty that serious injury was inflicted nonaccidentally on a 
child by his parent." Dembitz, Child Abuse and the Law-Fact and Fiction, 24 REcoRD 
OF N.Y.C.B.A. 613, 616 (1969). 
58. If the doctrinal barrier between ordinary equal protection and fundamental 
right analysis can be passed for these laws, the court rule that precise correlation 
between the end sought and the means chosen could readily invalidate both their 
loose procedures and their loose substantive formulations. The fundamental rights 
analysis would, notwithstanding occasional court protestations to the contrary, override 
the state's quite reasonable objection that this looseness is a necessary precondition to 
any sensible attack on the core of the problem of protecting neglected or abused 
children. Compare United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 
364 U.S. 479 (1960). 
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in 1969 and 1970. In March, 1969, New York newspapers reported 
that a three-year old girl, Roxanne Felumero, found dead and badly 
bruised, had been the subject of Family Court proceedings for 
alleged parental abuse and had been released in her parents' custody 
only two months earlier.59 Though the news accounts of the prior 
court involvement were apparently mistak.en,60 the New York legis-
lature responded to the great public outcry by rapidly enacting a 
new child abuse law. Less than a month after Roxanne's death, the 
Governor had signed the new law. The notable provisions were these. 
After a finding that a child was "abused," the court was required to 
"enter an order directing the removal of such child from his home."61 
A child was to be judged abused either if he "had serious physical or 
mental injury inflicted upon him by other than accidental means" 
or if he were "in the care and custody of a parent or other person 
who has been adjudicated a narcotic addict."62 The prior statute 
providing that a child involved in neglect or abuse proceedings 
would be represented by an appointed Law Guardian (unless re-
tained counsel appeared on behalf of the child) was replaced by a 
new provision that the allegedly abused child would be represented 
"during all stages of the proceedings by a police attorney" if the 
proceedings took place in New York City and by a district attorney 
if they occurred outside the city.63 In short, the legislature intended 
to remove significant parts of the wide-ranging discretion that had 
traditionally been given the Family Court in adjudicating when a 
child should be considered "abused" and determining what disposi-
59. See generally 24 R.EcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 347 (1969); N.Y. Times, March 29, 1969, 
§ I, at 36, col. 3. 
60. Following an investigation of the case, an internal disciplinary committee of 
the New York court system concluded that the Family Court had been justified in 
its refusal to remove Roxanne from her parents' custody because, contrary to news-
paper reports, the social agencies appearing before the court did not recommend home 
removal, and 
when the matter was before the court •.• there was no indication that the girl 
would be the victim of such a vicious crime •••. [The Family Court] judge was 
unaware of the living conditions in the [parents] home. 
The committee continued: 
While an abundance of evidence actually existed in the community which would 
have demonstrated the necessity of removing the child from her home no attempt 
to obtain that information had ever been made by the social agencies and conse• 
quently it was not known to [the court]. 
REPORT OF JUDICIARY RELATIONS COMM. OF THE FIRST DEPT., in 1 N.Y.L.J. July 1, 
1969, at 4. 
61. Law of April 28, 1969, ch. 264, § 1022, [1969] McKinneys N.Y. Laws 366 (repealed 
1970). 
62. Law of April 28, 1969, ch. 264, § 1012, [1969] McKinneys N.Y. Laws 363-64 (re-
pealed 1970). 
63. Law of April 28, 1969, ch. 264, § 1016, [1969] McKinneys N.Y. Laws 364 (re-
pealed 1970). 
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tion should then be made of the child. There could be no clearer 
legislative choice of priority between the interests of children and 
their parents, as the legislature perceived those conflicting interests. 
By May 1970, this new law had been repealed and essentially all 
of the discretion traditionally delegated to the Family Court had 
been returned to it. 64 In the interim, that court had struggled man-
fully to avoid the statutory rule that every "adjudicated narcotic 
addict" must, by virtue of that status alone, lose custody of his chil-
dren. 611 The professional fraternities of lawyers and social workers 
most directly involved in the operations of the Family Court had 
complained extensively of misconceptions in the new law. The 
Family Court and Family Law Committee of the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York was particularly critical of the new 
law on the following grounds: 
The new law is an extreme example of overreaction to a sensational 
case and should never have been passed or approved. . . . 
The new law ignores the basic problem in dealing adequately 
with child abuse cases. This problem is the lack of adequate court-
rooms, staff and placement and treatment facilities which are neces-
sary for any serious effort to reduce the problem of the battered child 
in our society. Some of the requirements of the new law will require 
expenditure of funds, yet the new law makes no appropriation for 
the same. An example is the new Section ... requiring removal of an 
abused child from the home. 66 
The 1969 New York law obviously was intended to reduce the 
role of individualized judgments regarding the need for removal of 
children from their homes. A powerful argument can be mounted 
that the 1969 rule that an "adjudicated narcotics addict" must lose 
custody of his child is unconstitutional: 67 not all addicts are, by that 
status alone, obviously unfit to raise children, and the low quality of 
alternative placements for most (if not all) children clearly shows 
that the provision sweeps more broadly than can comfortably be 
justified. But the question remains: What is the margin of error 
within which the legislature is entitled to act in protecting children? 
64. An Act to Amend the Family Court Act, May 1, 1970, ch. 962, [1970] McKinneys 
N.Y. Laws 2031·53 (codified in various sections of N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Acr). 
65. See In re John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 306 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Family Ct. 1969). 
66. Comm. on the Family Court & Family Law, The Enactment of the Abused 
Child Law and Committee Findings as to Defects in the Law (Laws 1969, c. 264), 24 
Rl:coRD OF THE N.Y.C.B.A. 347, 354 (1969). 
67. Judge Midonick suggested that such a reading of the statute would "rais[e] 
serious doubt of constitutional defect." In re John Children, 61 Misc. 2d 347, 364, 306 
N.Y.S.2d 797, 815 (Family Ct. 1969). 
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If it is obvious that this rule will apply to many children who need 
not, and should not, be removed from their homes notwithstanding 
parental narcotics addiction, it is equally obvious that in many cases 
parental narcotics addiction will significantly interfere with the 
parents' child-rearing capacities, and that at least some risk of this 
eventuality is present in all cases. Is it constitutionally mandated that, 
where there is doubt, the law must presume that children will not be 
hurt when they are living with parents who are narcotic addicts? 
Can a court comfortably conclude that under this rule of automatic 
removal more children will be hurt than will be helped? If the most 
a court can say is that ·wrongful and helpful interventions will be 
worked in random fashion, that would mean that benefit would re-
sult over the long haul in half the cases adjudicated. Is that too low 
an assurance to be constitutionally acceptable? 
Two ways appear to beckon to resolve this argument. One is to 
assert that it is unquestionably the case that most children will be 
best served by remaining with their parents no matter what the 
family situation, and that any judgment that does not strongly pre-
sume against removal is thus necessarily irrational. By this standard, 
automatic removal, as under the 1969 New York law, is clearly wrong. 
But this standard is not clearly right. The desirability of removing a 
child from his home depends on a complex calculus, and to the ex-
tent that the Constitution intrudes to dictate the manner in which 
this calculus can be carried out-for example, by mandating a "pre-
sumption against removal" in all cases-it can obstruct the ease and/ 
or the precision with which that calculus is made. 
The second approach is to assert that the Constitution commands 
-not for rationality alone, but to honor "fundamental values"-
that the state employ presumptions in favor of natural parents' 
retaining custody of their children. Such a constitutional right is, 
of course, a judicial ipse dixit, but it does correspond to an emo-
tion widely felt in our society. Nevertheless, its applicability in 
this context, or indeed in any context, is problematic. The pro-
genitor of the principle, Meyer v. Nebraska,68 indicated that the 
right to rear one's children as one chose did not extend to permitting 
acts "harmful" to children.69 As examples of this excepted category, 
the Court cited noncompliance with state laws for compulsory school 
attendance or for study of particular curricular subjects.70 
The standard that the Meyer Court had in mind to distinguish 
68. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
69. 262 U.S. at 403. 
70. 262 U.S. at 402. 
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harmful from nonharmful parental conduct is obscure. The Court 
reached the conclusion, with puzzling ease, that a state law requiring 
elementary school children (including in particular those from non-
English speaking homes) to be educated exclusively in English dur-
ing school hours was not a reasonable prophylactic against the harm 
of child-rearing practices that isolate children from ready participa-
tion in the broader community.71 But there were important cultural 
values at stake (which touch the freedom to learn and to express one-
self, as the Supreme Court has recently reinterpreted Meyer)72 in 
preserving opportunity for parents to decide what language shall be 
taught their children. The 1v1eyer Court could reasonably see those 
cultural values under attack as such in a midwestern state with a 
sizeable German-speaking population immediately following World 
War I. Are there similar values at issue in the 1969 New York rule 
that narcotics addicts are unfit to have custody of childen? Can a 
court as easily conclude that parental addiction is as little harmful to 
children as parental desire that children be schooled in a foreign 
language? 
!If.eyer has continuing vitality in the jurisprudence of the mod-
ern Court, and the catch-phrase that, irrespective of parental short-
comings, the parent-child relationship is constitutionally protected, 
as "sacred" in its inviolacy as the marriage relationship,73 does res-
onate deeply. If this relationship can be characterized as warranting 
the protection that the Court offers other "fundamental rights," the 
Court could properly overturn the 1969 New York law. Even the 
1970 law would be vulnerable to such an attack because of its many 
opportunities for "bias" and "whim" to influence judgment, derived 
from the absence of precisely formulated rationales for state action in 
individual cases74-and this is the essence of the administration of 
child abuse and neglect laws in every state. 75 
In final analysis, however, there is no compelling logic that would 
resolve this argument. Child abuse and neglect laws touch values to-
ward which the Court has traditionally been solicitous. The closeness 
71. Justice Holmes dissented in Meyer, on the ground that "it is desirable that 
all citizens of the United States should speak a common tongue ... [and the means 
chosen by the state to achieve this end] present a question upon which men reasonably 
might differ.'' 262 U.S. at 412. 
72. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Dist., 393 U.S. 508, 511 (1969); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1965) ("[W]e reaffirm the principle of the 
... Meyer case.''). 
73. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
74. See Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065, 
1076-1132 (1969). 
75. See text accompanying note 53 supra. 
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of the criminal analogue in the operation of these laws and the hal-
lowed status of the parent-child relation in our society cannot easily 
be overlooked. But neither can the Court ignore the potential for 
deeply hurtful abuse of authority of parent over child that our root-
less, anomic society most particularly affords. In this argument, Wy-
man looks to one direction, Gault to the other. Neither posture is a 
priori compelling. 
But if it is therefore equally proper in constitutional logic for the 
Court to adopt either approach, it is equally improper that either be 
adopted. If we are reasoning circularly, we are in a circle. Thus the 
Court can do nothing more than seek a resolution of the competing 
arguments that, to the greatest degree possible, avoids totally sub-
ordinating one principle to the other and instead, to the greatest 
degree possible, works an accommodation of both. 
The Court must attempt to accommodate its interests in protect-
ing traditional constitutional concerns in traditional fashion-by 
insisting on precise individualized judgments of the need for state 
intervention-with competing legislative interests that legitimately 
argue against such attempts at precision. A closer examination of the 
operation of child abuse and neglect laws suggests some guidelines 
for this accommodation. For this purpose, it will be useful to return 
to the New York legislature's experiences in 1969 and 1970, and to 
indulge some speculations about the psychological dynamics of those 
experiences. 
Enactment of the 1969 law, which boldly swept "abused" children 
from their "abusing" parents, might appear dramatically to reflect 
a "rescue fantasy" against which it is commonplace (though often 
ineffective) to warn individual caseworkers and judges who deal with 
abuse and neglect cases. John Bowlby in his classic work on separat-
ing children from parents characterized this fantasy as follows: 
[S]o long as caseworkers do not know the limitations [in removing 
children from their homes for whatever reason], but live, as some do, 
in the sentimental glamour of saving neglected children from wicked 
parents, they will act impetuously in relieving parents of their re-
sponsibilities and, by their actions, convey to the parents the belief 
that the child is far better off in the care of others. Only if the case-
worker is mature enough and trained enough to respect even bad 
parents and to balance the less-evident long-term considerations 
against the manifest and perhaps urgent short-term ones, will she 
help the parents themselves and do a good tum to the child.76 
76. J. BOWLBY, supra note 55, at 140. 
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One important explanation why "rescue" of the child from his "bad" 
parents may be no help at all to the child was stated this way: 
The attachment of children to parents who, by all ordinary stan-
dards, are very bad is a never-ceasing source of wonder to those who 
seek to help them. Even when they are with kindly foster-parents 
these children feel their roots to be in the homes where, perhaps, 
they have been neglected and ill-treated, and keenly resent criticisms 
directed against their parents. Efforts made to "save" the child from 
his bad surroundings and to give him new standards are commonly 
of no avail, since it is his own parents who, for good or ill, he values 
and with whom he is identified. (This is a fact of critical importance 
when considering how best to help children who are living in intol-
erable conditions.)77 
But just as it was difficult for the New York legislature, and for 
individual judges and caseworkers, to perceive the depth of attach-
ment that a child can feel toward very bad parents, it may be equally 
difficult for them to acknowledge that some, or any, parents are in 
fact very bad toward their children. In some ways, the rapid retreat 
of the New York legislature in 1970 from its adamant stance of 1969 
that hurt children should be taken posthaste from bad parents mir-
rors a common state response to individual neglect and abuse cases: 
swift, indiscriminate removal of an apparently wronged child from 
his parents, followed after some official dallying and confusion by 
a return to the status quo ante, with at least some of the participants 
in the events sadder, but not wiser.78 
The reasons for possible misperceptions are clear, whether these 
misperceptions are an inappropriate "rescue fantasy" or a persistent 
refusal to accept the stark reality that a particular child must be 
removed from his parent. Though the explanation is readily acces-
sible from common sense, approaching the matter through psychi-
atric terminology will be helpful. In psychiatric parlance, the ex-
planation for these potential misperceptions is termed "counter-
transference." In the context in which it was developed, this concept 
refers to the unconsciously derived attitudes and identifications that 
77. Id. at 80. 
78. See Terr&: ·watson, supra note 55. A recent report by the New York State Board 
of Social Welfare suggests the typicality of this pattern in New York City foster-care 
services: "The fact that over half of the children discharged from care return to their 
own families or relatives suggests that many of them might have been cared for at 
home at great savings, without intervening foster care." N.Y. Times, May 16, 1971, 
§ 1, at 57, col. 1. The fact noted by the Board holds true according to a recent survey 
whether the child was placed in foster care by court action or by the city Bureau of 
Child Welfare. Fanshel, The Exit of Children from Foster Care: An Interim Research 
Report, CHILD WELFARE, Feb. 1971, at 65, 71. 
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a therapist projects onto his patient.79 It is the natural and inescap-
able counterpart to the unconscious projections of the patient onto 
the therapist, and, indeed, this process of transference/ counter-
transference is simply a way of describing an important aspect of all 
human interactions. For psychoanalysis the transference concept 
has basic importance because it is the patient's transferences onto 
the therapist that become the central focus of the therapeutic proc-
ess. Through identification and rational exploration of that trans-
ference, the patient is brought to see the role that his unconscious 
is playing in affecting his everyday behavior, and the unconsciously 
motivated behavior thereby becomes accessible to modification. But 
unless the therapist's own unconscious processes engaged by the 
patient's personality and behavior are rationally accessible to the 
therapist, that is, unless the therapist can rationally scrutinize his 
counter-transferences, his perceptions of the patient will be hope-
lessly clouded by the intenveavings of his own projections with the 
reality presented by the patient. The therapist would be thereby dis-
abled from sensibly diagnosing and pursuing a fruitful treatment 
strategy for his patient. 
The problems of counter-transference can be similarly disabling 
for sensible judicial response to child abuse and neglect cases. A 
judge's desire to punish the parents and remove their child from 
home, when he believes they have acted (and when in fact they have 
acted) hurtfully toward the child, can be as much, or more, a prod-
uct of the judge's unconscious identifications in the transaction as it 
is his reasoned response that this child will best be helped by removal 
from these particular parents. Similarly, the judge's convictions that 
this child should not be removed from these parents can be a reaction 
more to his unconscious identifications than to the reality presented 
by the abusing family. This situation has been described, from a 
psychiatrist's perspective, in this way: 
Probably the first difficulty met by the therapist is the management 
of his own feelings about a parent who has hurt a small baby. Most 
people react with disbelief and denial, or on the other hand, with 
horror and a surge of anger toward the abuser .... [The therapist 
must] gain a more useful, neutral position ... 80• 
The capacity to gain this "more useful, neutral position"-that 
79. See generally excerpts from A. FREuD, THE Eco AND THE MEclIANISMS OF DEFENSE 
(19!!6), in J. KATZ, J. GoLDSTEIN &: A. DERSHowrrz, PSYCHOANALYSIS, PSYCHIATRY AND 
LAw 144-47 (1967) [hereinafter KATZ]; excerpts from Gil, Psychoanalysis and Explora• 
tory Psychotherapy, in KATZ, supra at 669-71; Schafer, On the Nature of the Thera-
peutic Relationship, in KATZ, supra at 722-24. 
80. Steele & Pollock, supra note 55, at 138. 
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is, to scrutinize and factor out the counter-transference-is a hard-
won therapeutic skill.81 It cannot be expected that most, or even 
many, of the judges and court-affiliated personnel charged with the 
administration of child abuse and neglect laws will have developed 
this skill. Yet without this capability, the prospects that any given 
judge will respond to an abusing family in a way that will accurately 
account for the child's needs and interests is at best wholly random, 
wholly dependent on the chance that this judge's unconsciously 
motivated perceptions happen to coincide with the real situation of 
the family before him. 
If it is important and properly a constitutional concern-which, 
within limits, it is-to combat the possibility that state officials will 
misperceive the need for intervention, there is one constitutional 
right that the Court might fruitfully apply to this purpose. The 
Court could assert that the parents of an allegedly abused or ne-
glected child have a right to retained or appointed counsel. Parental 
counsel would promise to be one clear voice in the proceedings with 
an unalloyed interest in opposing any state intervention. In essence, 
this voice would combat transference-derived fantasies that home-
removal is appropriate, and would thus work to bring therapeutic 
self-awareness to court personnel by insisting on the need to attend 
to the reality of the case at hand. 
In some states, as noted earlier, counsel is appointed to represent 
the child in these proceedings.82 But this role as spokesman for the 
"child's interest" forces counsel to resolve for himself-possibly in 
a manner dominated by his own unconscious processes-whether 
the child's interest points to or away from removal from the home. 
81. 
What helps the analyst maintain an adequate degree of neutrality and balance? 
I do not pretend to offer a complete answer to this question but mention only a 
handful of salient factors. There is his intelligence and especially his common 
sense about people that enable him to appreciate the complexity of human ex-
perience and to keep his bearings in the face of it. There is his capacity for sub-
limated interest in the emotional lives of other persons. There is his belief in the 
unconscious which enables him to take strong emotions as partial and often direct 
expressions of processes going on beneath the surface. There is his personal analysis 
wliich increases his understanding of himself and fortifies his emotional stability so 
that he is not vulnerable to every passing reaction to him and not itching to form 
transferences of his own. Then there is the factor of his leading a personal life 
of his own that is sufficiently satisfying that he is not dependent on his patients 
for direct, nonprofessional gratifications. Also, his experience with patients teaches 
him that much of the time the feelings they have about him have little objective 
foundation and may change drastically even from one moment to the next. His 
formal training is another help, for he learns from it, among other things, how to 
recognize, investigate and understand emotions directed at his person or behavior 
as analyst. Finally there are his ethical sense and his ideals which are expressed in 
his respecting his patient and his keeping a watchful eye on his own frailties and 
self-indulgent tendencies. 
Schafer, On the Nature of the Therapeutic Relationship, in KATZ, supra note 79, at 723. 
82. See note 36 supra. 
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Counsel for the child is thus of no predictable assistance in forcing 
the administering court to confront and sort out its real as against 
its fantasy urgings for intervention to help the child. 
It is, of course, true that parental counsel's insistent presence will 
serve to reinforce a court's fantasy, as opposed to real, convictions 
that no intervention is necessary. But if the judge or administering 
personnel are thus inclined, it seems likely that they will find reasons 
for nonintervention even without counsel to suggest them. Thus, 
it can be reasonably concluded, the presence of parental counsel 
would materially advance the constitutionally derived concern that 
an individualized, relatively precise judgment precede the removal 
of a child from his parents, without unduly jeopardizing a quite 
reasonable contrary concern that removal might be inappropriately 
denied because courts may deny the reality of risks of harm to the 
child. Additionally, in order to avoid reinforcing this inappropriate 
denial of the need for intervention by administering officials, the 
parental right to counsel might be held subject to waiver, although 
an excellent argument can be made against permitting waiver of 
counsel in these proceedings. 83 
In short, the presence of parental counsel would be intended to 
guard against misperceptions by administering officials. It is, how-
ever, possible that counsel's presence might work to forestall those 
officials from acting on wholly adequate perceptions of the need for 
intervention to protect the child, or that counsel might serve to 
withhold information that would otherwise be available and on 
which officials might base an adequate judgment for intervention. 
Although this is a legitimate concern, the Court is entitled to require 
that it be met by provisions carefully tailored to deal with it. To 
require that counsel be completely excluded is to insist that the 
Court unduly sacrifice its constitutionally derived interests in these 
proceedings. 
The legitimate legislative interest in pressing administering of-
ficials to identify and protect needy children can, however, to a 
substantial degree be vindicated by ensuring that those officials have 
ready access to a wide range of information about the child and his 
family. As indicated, the presence of a parental advocate might be 
expected to combat the punitive fantasies that can lead to inappro-
priate removal of a particular child from his parents. But the pres-
ence of extensive information about the child and his family might 
83. See discussion regarding waiver of rights in juvenile delinquency proceedings in 
text accompanying note 123 infra, and regarding welfare home visits in text accompany-
ing note 145 infra. 
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be expected to combat the wishful denials of some officials that 
parents are ever bad to their children. The most sensible accommoda-
tion of competing judicial and legislative concerns in the adminis-
tration of child abuse and neglect laws would be to ensure that any 
decision to intervene in family life is preceded by searching scrutiny, 
and that extensive information about the family is available to ad-
ministering officials by which they might see whether intervention 
is needed. 
For this reason, it would be inappropriate to extend the self-
incrimination right to parents alleged to have abused or neglected 
their children, when the purpose of the inquiry is to decide whether 
the child must be protected from the parent by removal from the 
home or by other means. 84 Rather, administrative officials must be 
free both to insist that parents speak fully about their relations with 
the child and to draw appropriate negative inferences from parental 
resistance to such disclosures. On this ground, it would also be im-
proper to apply stringent "probable cause" standards as a pre-
requisite to medical examinations of the child or his parents. Par-
ticularly when dealing with younger children, and most emphatically 
when dealing with preverbal children, there are staggering eviden-
tiary problems in distinguishing between those physical or emotional 
conditions of the child that do and those that do not indicate a 
serious impairment of parent-child relations.85 Is this child's skull 
fracture accidental, as his parents now insist, or was it inflicted by 
parental beatings? Is this child's apparently disturbed behavior the 
precursor of a full-blown psychopathology that requires interven-
tion into family interactions as early as possible, or is this behavior 
an attribute of a developmental process that will yield to "the self-
healing qualities of further development"?86 To make these distinc-
tions in individual cases can be a complex and difficult task, even if 
the diagnostician has access to all conceivable information about the 
child's developmental history and his family's interactions with him. 
But without access to such information, differential diagnosis is 
impossible. 
84. Self-incrimination rights, and the entire panoply of criminal safeguards, should 
obviously apply in criminal prosecutions brought against parents for allegedly mis-
treating their children. Criminal "cruelty to children" statutes in particular are typically 
designed so that loss of child custody and application of criminal sanctions could follow 
from the same findings of fact. Child neglect statutes leading to custody loss or some 
other intervention into family life are, however, typically framed more broadly than 
the criminal proscriptions. See Paulsen, supra note 48, at 680-86, 693-703. 
85. See Dembitz, supra note 57. 
86. Ernest Kris, cited by A. Freud in Child Observation and Prediction of Develop-
ment, 13 PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDY OF nm Cm:u> 92, 98 (1958). 
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It is true that further development of the child will necessarily 
reveal what the presenting symptom foretold. But if the child's skull 
fracture was a symptom of a pattern of parental abuse, we can hardly 
afford to wait for confirmation if we hope effectively to protect the 
child. Or if the child's odd behavior is a precursor of more obvious 
psychopathology, early intervention is equally essential to assure 
the possibility of successful treatment.87 Anna Freud correctly warns 
that "as knowledge stands at present, it is difficult to draw the line 
between prediction of pathology based on authentic danger signals, 
and a diffuse and indiscriminate over-anxiousness, all too easily 
aroused by every slight deviation from the optimal and from the 
87. Anna Freud graphically makes this point: 
It is easier, therapeutically, to intervene in a process of symptom formation in 
the fluid state than to deal with hardened symptoms. There is no child analyst, 
I believe, who would not welcome the next step forward to a state of affairs which 
places therapeutic intervention even earlier, namely at time before symptom 
formation has been resorted to at all. 
To mention [one] example ... of my own e.xperience ... I had the opportu-
nity, several years ago, to meet with a small boy's facial tic, one or two days after 
its appearance, to guess its meaning, and to dissolve it almost immediately by 
means of analytic interpretation. In this intervention I was guided, not only by 
the clinical data provided by the child, but by the lucky chance of an additional 
"longitudinal" observation of his life history. He was one of the former war chil-
dren whose family fortunes and misfortunes I had followed from a near distance. 
I knew about his intimacy with his mother in infancy when he was alone with her; 
his unrelenting hostility against his father when he returned, injured, from the 
war; his immense jealousy when a sibling was born; and his complete lack of 
manifest affect when his mother fell ill and died in connection with her next 
pregnancy. The tic appeared a year after his mother's death, at the age of sLx, 
following a slight nosebleed. It was two-timed and consisted of a quick sniffing up 
and blowing down through the nostrils, repeated at short intervals. 
It seemed legitimate to me to combine past and present information for the pur-
pose of analytic action. There seemed no doubt that the tic represented the cul-
mination and attempted solution of many conflicts of his past history: fear of 
injury to his body, heightened by the death wishes against father and sibling, now 
turned against himself; his unconscious strivings for kmininity and the fear of 
them; his resentment about being neglected and "rejected" by the mother; his tak-
ing upon himself the mother's role in stopping the bleeding (by sniffing up) and 
testing the result again and again for reassurance (by blowing down). It was this 
latter meaning, I believe, which determined the selection of the symptom. The 
child had withdrawn libido from the object world, following his threefold dis-
appointment in the mother (return of father, arrival of sibling, her death), and 
had cathected his own body instead, thereby giving inflated, hypochondriacal im-
portance to his body ailments. His tic represented a pathological way of playing 
mother-and-child with his own body; he took over the role of mother in a com-
forting and reassuring capacity, while his body represented himself in the role of 
the frightened and suffering child. 
"\Vas it really necessary to let this child wait for help until there was a manifest 
outbreak of pathology in the form of symptom formation? Is this not one of those 
typical sequences which, according to our knowledge of life histories, would bound 
to lead to pathology? Could we not have spotted pathology in this case "before it 
appeared," merely ... "from the child's behavior, from that of the family unit, 
from the history of the child and mother"? There is only disadvantage ..• in wait-
ing with therapy until the whole host of conflicting ideas and impulses in the child 
are compressed into a symptom, and moreover one which is notoriously difficult to 
remove by analysis once it has established itself and been allowed to persist for 
any length of time. 
Id. at 99-100. 
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norm."88 The personnel who administer child abuse and neglect 
laws are even more likely than Miss Freud to have difficulty draw-
ing this line. But these difficulties do not justify withholding from 
diagnostic personnel access to information upon which informed 
judgments might be based. It is tempting to forbid access to informa-
tion as a prophylaxis against possible (or even probable) misuse of 
that information. But to embrace this rule as a constitutional prin-
ciple is to deny the possibility that the child-protective agencies can 
ever improve their capacities to match performance with promise. 
To embrace this rule as a constitutional principle would meet the 
Court's concern to protect traditional values, but it would unduly 
subordinate the legitimate interests expressed in the competing leg-
islative judgment favoring early intervention to protect children.89 
The accommodation urged here-that widest access to informa-
tion be assured to assist in identifying child abuse or neglect, but 
that rigorous scrutiny be directed to any conclusions derived from 
that information, in part by assuring the active participation of 
parental counsel-might appear to be in conflict when a court must 
consider what kind of confrontation rights should be afforded in 
abuse or neglect proceedings. Two objections can be raised against 
the proposition that all witnesses favoring state intervention must 
testify in open court and be fully available for cross-examination. 
First, it can be argued that confidentiality must be guaranteed in 
order to assure either that private citizens will readily report child 
abuse or neglect incidents or that professional personnel will speak 
and write freely about the case. But such speculative gains from as-
suring anonymity, particularly considered against the substantial 
likelihood that anonymity often will merely mask spitefulness or 
incompetence, are clearly outweighed by the interest in full exam-
ination of the bases of any judgment removing a child from his 
parents or otherwise significantly intervening in his family. 
88. Id. at 103. 
89. To insist that probable cause showings need not precede information searches, 
such as compulsory medical examinations, does not, of course, mean that prior judicial 
approval of such searches should not be required. To the contrary, a warrant pro-
cedure, using a "reasonableness" standard, is essential to protect parents and children 
against purposeless invasions of privacy. Compare In re Vulon Children, 56 Misc. 2d 
19, 288 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Family Ct. 1968), in which Judge Dembitz properly refused to 
find neglect based on parental refusal to accept psychiatric examination of an eight 
year old girl, who had originally been reported by hospital authorities as an "abused 
child," on suspicion that she had been sexually molested. Notwithstanding virtually 
conclusive medical findings that the apparent evidence of molestation was merely an 
internally-caused vaginal bleeding, the New York City Bureau of Child Welfare sought 
a compulsory psychiatric examination of the girl and her older sister and brother ap-
parently further to explore whether the child had been molested. 
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Second, it can be argued that public exposure of medical or psy-
chiatric data might interfere with the prospects for subsequent treat-
ment of the child or his parents. This is a substantial concern, but 
it can be accommodated on a case-by-case basis by insisting that a 
court be clearly convinced of the reality of therapeutic needs for 
nondisclosure.90 The general rule should, however, favor application 
of the constitutional right to full confrontation in open court. 
Confrontation should be provided at both the adjudicative and 
dispositional stages of child abuse and neglect proceedings. The 
constitutional confrontation guarantees as applied in criminal pro-
ceedings are at present limited to the "adjudicative" trial and have 
not yet been extended to sentencing proceedings, to assure access, 
for example, to presentence reports.91 This limitation in criminal 
proceedings is based on the logic, however flawed, that an adjudica-
tion that a person has committed a criminal act renders him subject 
to whatever various purposes-punishment, deterrence, rehabilita-
tion-the state might see fit to pursue. But for child abuse and 
neglect proceedings, it is inconsistent with the internal logic of the 
state laws completely to compartmentalize adjudication and disposi-
tion. The professed state purpose in these laws is to protect the 
child. That purpose cannot be implemented unless the state can 
comparatively evaluate the parental misconduct and its potential 
harmfulness to the child with the available dispositional alternatives 
and their potential harmfulness to the child. The unanimous outcry 
against, and the rapid abandonment of, the 1969 New York heresy, 
which automatically linked home removal with a finding of parental 
misconduct, demonstrates that state laws generally accept this theoreti-
cal premise (though they do not always put it into effective opera-
tion). The state abuse and neglect laws should be taken at face value 
on this matter, and should thus not be permitted to distinguish 
between adjudication and disposition proceedings for purposes of 
applying confrontation rights. 
Two additional matters must be considered. First, though the 
civil standard of proof is applied by many states in child abuse and 
neglect proceedings, the argument for the application of the criminal 
"beyond reasonable doubt" standard can readily be drawn from the 
preceding discussion. The argument draws persuasiveness not merely 
from the proximity of the criminal law analogues to these proceed-
ings. Since the "reasonable-doubt standard . . . 'impresses on the 
90. See In re Blaine, 54 Misc. 2d 248, 282 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Family Ct. 1967). 
91. See generally F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, M. MELLI &: H. GOLDSIEIN, 
CRIMINAL JurnCE .ADMINISTRATION 699-710 (1969). 
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trier . . . the necessity of reaching a subjective state of certitude 
••• ,' " 92 that standard would aid the Court in accomplishing its pur-
pose in insisting that rigorous scrutiny be directed to any compulsory 
interventions into family processes responding to child abuse or 
neglect. This question is, however, a close one. In criminal prosecu-
tions, the reasonable-doubt standard typically is seen to apply to 
factual adjudications. Although the criminal standard has recently 
been extended to juvenile court proceedings, it was apparently 
limited to "the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile is charged with 
an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult."93 
There are, of course, factual disputes in the application of child 
abuse and neglect laws. But particularly in neglect cases, an inter-
pretive evaluation regarding the psychological significance to the 
child of the "neglecting acts" proved is an essential step in the 
adjudication.04 Thus it may seem misleading, and demanding a false 
certainty, to insist that child abuse and neglect laws be applied 
with the same standard of proof that adheres for "pure fact" ad-
judications. But there are many such "impure fact" adjudications 
in the criminal law lexicon-distinguishing, for example, between 
degrees of crime based on whether "premeditation" exists, which 
must be judged "beyond a reasonable doubt." Imprecise as such an 
instruction might seem to the administrators of child abuse and 
neglect laws, the instruction nonetheless would appear a salutary 
exhortation to assure close scrutiny of these cases. By its very im-
precision the instruction would likely work little interference in 
the legitimate operations of those laws. 95 
Second, there are few practical protections to assure that children 
will remain free from state custody prior to an abuse or neglect 
adjudication. A large number of public officials and private persons 
are authorized and even encouraged under state laws to remove 
children from their homes until a court determines whether they 
92. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970), quoting Dorsen & Rezneck, In re Gault 
and the Future of Juvenile Law, 1 FAMILY L.Q., Oct. 1967, at 26. 
93. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). See discussion in note 26 supra. 
94. The Standard Juvenile Court Act, promulgated by the National Probation and 
Parole Association, provides that the juvenile court bas jurisdiction over any child 
"whose environment is injurious to his welfare." STANDARD JUVENILE COURT Acr § 8(2)-
(b) (1959). The "neglect" formulations in typical state statutes are similarly open-
textured. See Paulsen, supra note 48, at 693-94. 
95. In imposing the criminal proof standard in juvenile proceedings, the Supreme 
Court noted the concession of the juvenile court officials that "use of the reasonable 
doubt standard probably would not have a serious impact if all that resulted would 
be a change in the quantum of proof." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 366 n.4 (1970) 
(citing appellee's brief). 
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have been abused or neglected.96 But such provisions for pretrial 
custody in abuse and neglect laws cannot be overturned simply be-
cause custody precedes the trial, for there can often be crucially 
imp9rtant reasons for swift removal to ensure the safety of children. 
Unless a variety of people are authorized to remove such children-
and encouraged to do so, for example, by immunity from subsequent 
civil liability for "good faith" actions97-natural reluctance to inter-
fere with parent-child relationships might predominate to the 
marked disadvantage of many children. Therefore, rather than at-
tacking such "pretrial custody" wholesale, the legislature and the 
courts should work to ensure speedy and automatic review of all 
such preliminary actions.98 Indeed, it is not clear that the Constitu-
tion demands more than this, even for pretrial release in criminal 
proceedings. 99 
III. PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM THEMSELVES: 
GAULT RE-EXAMINED 
To this point, Gault and Wyman, when applied to child abuse 
and neglect laws, have been treated as polar instructions. The pre-
ceding discussion of these laws can rest on the premise that both 
Gault and Wyman were correctly decided in their contexts, but 
that child abuse and neglect laws straddle both. It can be argued 
that, like the delinquency laws in Gault, but unlike the welfare laws 
in Wyman, these laws threaten parents with grave sanctions-loss of 
their children and stigmatization as "bad parents"; but like the laws 
in Wyman, and unlike those in Gault, the purpose of these laws is 
to protect children from their parents rather than to protect society 
at large from random antisocial acts. Thus, it might appear that 
the analytic justification for applying some but not all criminal 
protections to child abuse and neglect proceedings follows from the 
strength of both competing characterizations. 
But this argument is too glib. Gault's context, in particular, can-
not be tidily distinguished from child-protective legislation by assert-
ing that the predominant purpose of the juvenile laws is to protect 
96. See note 37 supra. The New York statute, for example, provides that "emergency" 
removal or detention from parental custody may be carried out, without prior court 
authorization, by a "peace officer, or an agent of a duly incorporated society for the 
prevention of cruelty to children or a designated employee of a city or county depart-
ment of social services ••• or any physician treating such child." N.Y. FAMILY Or. Acr 
§ 1024(a) (McKinney 1963). 
97. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY Cr. Ac::r § 1024(c) (McKinney 1963). 
98. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. Ac::r § 1027 (McKinney 1963). 
99. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951). 
; I 
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the community against delinquent acts, as opposed to protecting 
the juvenile against his parents or even against himself. There are 
differences between child abuse and neglect laws and delinquency 
laws. In the latter, there is typically not a clearly drawn contest be-
tween parents and state agencies regarding the welfare of a child 
unable effectively to protect himself against either his parents or 
the state. In child abuse and neglect laws, both parents and the state 
can reasonably claim to act as surrogate for the child's best interest, 
and the child cannot be expected to exercise independent judgment 
in choosing between competing versions of his interests. 
But there are compelling similarities between neglect laws and 
delinquency laws in their operational contexts. There is, first of 
all, considerable overlap between them in terms of the coercive 
jurisdiction each confers. The same acts that establish a delinquency 
adjudication can also quite readily establish parental neglect, es-
sentially for failure to exercise proper guidance and control as 
evidenced by the child's delinquent actions.100 The juvenile can thus 
be placed in the state's custody either as a "delinquent" or as a 
"neglected" child. And if, for example, a child must be given self-
incrimination rights to protect himself against state coercion for de-
linquent acts, he must equally be shielded from "self-incrimination" 
in the operation of neglect and abuse laws that simply overlap de-
linquency laws. But if the criminal self-incrimination rights for the 
child are carried wholesale into abuse and neglect proceedings and 
are accompanied by the ordinary rule that any waiver must be "know-
ing and intelligent,"101 it is evident that court personnel could never 
interview a young child alleged to be neglected or abused. This con-
sequence inappropriately constricts legitimate state policy. Too much 
information, needed to protect the child, would be withheld from 
the state. This is the same reason that led to the earlier conclusion 
that the self-incrimination right should be withheld from parents 
in neglect or abuse proceedings in which child custody alone was at 
issue.102 
There is a further related reason that the self-incrimination right 
should not be granted to young children in child abuse or neglect 
proceedings. The right should be withheld not because there is no 
"sanction" or "stigma" at stake for the child in these proceedings; 
as noted earlier,103 from the child's perspective, at least, the "remedy" 
100. See notes 27 &: 94 supra. 
IOI. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
102. See text accompanying note 84 supra. 
103. See text accompanying note 45 supra. 
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of removal from his parents, however bad they may be, can quite 
readily appear as a desperately harsh punishment. The right should 
be withheld, rather, because the child cannot be expected to have 
sufficient capacity to choose between his loyalties to his parents and 
his personal need to be free from their mistreatment. The purpose 
of state intervention must be, first, to determine whether the child 
does in fact need to be free and, if so, then to help him successfully 
get free. For this purpose, state officials must have access to the child, 
both to permit and to support disloyalty to his parents when such 
disloyalty is necessary for the child's good. A preschool child, in par-
ticular, is peculiarly incapacitated to free himself from belief in his 
parents' omnipotence. He is both psychologically and practically 
utterly dependent (though not without influence within the fam-
ily).104 For this reason, it would be wrong to insist as a matter of 
constitutional principle that the preschool child be given some in-
dependent role in withholding permission from the state to intervene 
in his life for his welfare. The grant of such independent role, as 
104. Compare Anna Freud's discussion of this issue as it affects therapeutic strategics 
in treating young children: 
Some of the most lively controversies concerning the specificity of child analysis 
are related to the question whether and how far parents should be included in the 
therapeutic process. Although this is overtly a technical point, the issue at stake is 
a theoretical one, namely, the decision whether and from which point onward a 
child should cease to be considered as a product of and dependent on his family 
and should be given the status of a separate entity, a psychic structure in its own 
right. 
As regards the patient's developmental status, i.e., the steps taken by him toward 
attaining individuality, it is essential for the analyst to realize in which of the vital 
respects the child leans on the parents and how far he has outgrown them. Whether 
the state of his dependency, or independence, is in accordance with his clrronological 
age can be assessed approximately from the following uses a child makes consecu-
tively of the parents: 
for narcissistic unity with a motherly figure, at the age when no distinction is 
made between self and environment; 
for leaning on their capacity to understand and manipulate external conditions so 
that body needs and drive derivatives can be satisfied; 
as figures in the external world to whom initially narcissistic libido can be at-
tached and where it can be converted into object libido; 
to act as limiting agents to drive satisfaction, thereby initiating the child's own ego 
mastery of the id; 
to provide the patterns for identification which are needed for building up an 
independent structure. 
For the analyst of children ..• all the indications ••• bear ••• witness to the 
powerful influence of the environment. In treatment, especially the very young 
reveal the extent to which they are dominated by the object world, i.e., how much 
of their behavior and pathology is determined by environmental influences such 
as the parents' protective or rejecting, loving or indifferent, critical or admiring 
attitudes, as well as by the sexual harmony or disharmony in their married life. 
The child's symbolic play in the analytic session communicates not only his in-
ternal fantasies; simultaneously it is his manner of communicating current family 
events, such as nightly intercourse between the parents, their marital quarrels and 
upsets, their frustrating and anxiety-arousing actions, their abnormalities and 
pathological expressions. 
A. ]°REUD, NORMALITY AND PATHOLOGY IN CHILDHOOD, 43, 46, 50-51 (1965). 
June 1971] Forcing Protection on Children & Their Parents 1291 
the Gault Court explicitly acknowledged, is at base the purpose of 
the constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.105 
With increasing age and increasing experience outside the home, 
a child comes more realistically to understand that he need not 
simply be acted upon by his environment, including his parental 
environment, but that he can be a self-willed actor and influence 
in that environment. With that growing understanding comes grow-
ing capacity to make independent choices of the kind that the self-
incrimination right is intended to protect. Some delinquent be-
havior is, however, symptomatic of disturbances in this growth proc-
ess. It cannot be said that all behavior that the community regards 
as "delinquent" is thus symptomatic. Nor can such delinquent be-
havior be precisely quantified or readily identified at the moment 
a particular child comes to the attention of state authorities. But 
when delinquent behavior does connote this disturbance, it can 
connote an incapacity to exercise the right against self-incrimination. 
That is, for some young or adolescent children, delinquent behavior 
results from family disturbances that place the child in a bind quite 
similar to that which has been described for the younger child subject 
to abuse or neglect proceeding.106 
105. The Gault Court stated: 
[T]he privilege reflects the limits of the individual's attornment to the state and-
in a philosophical sense-insists upon the equality of individual and the state. • •• 
One of its purposes is to prevent the state, whether by force or by psychological 
domination, from overcoming the mind and will of the person under investigation 
and depriving him of the freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing 
his conviction. 
387 U.S. at 47. 
106. Compare this case described by Anna Freud, drawing generally on the work 
of August Aichhorn: 
About two and a half years ago I made the analytical acquaintance of a difficult 
little girl of nearly eleven. She was from the well-to-do Viennese middle-class, but 
the relationships in her home were unfavourable, for her father was weak and little 
concerned with her, the mother had been dead for some years, and her relation-
ship with the father's second wife and a younger stepbrother was unsatisfactory. 
A number of thefts by the child, and an unending series of crude lies and small 
and great concealments and insincerities had determined the stepmother, on the 
advice of the family physician, to seek the aid of analysis. Here the analytical treaty 
was ••• simple. "Your parents cannot do anything with you,'' was the basis of the 
negotiations, "with their help alone you will never get out of the constant scenes 
and conflicts. Perhaps you will try the help of a stranger." She accepted me with-
out more ado as an ally against her parents .••• 
My next procedure in this ••• case was throughout that recommended by Aich-
horn for the educational treatment of delinquent children. The probation officer 
entrusted with the care of such children, says Aichhorn, must first of all put him-
self on the side of the delinquent, and assume that the child is justified in its 
attitude to those about it. Only so will he succeed in working with his charge in-
stead of against him. I might emphasize here that Aichhorn's position for this 
kind of work has considerable advantage over that of the analyst. He is authorized 
to interfere by the state or town, and he has behind him the authority of an 
official position. The analyst on the contrary, as the child knows, is commissioned 
and perhaps paid by the parents, and he always gets into an awkward position if 
he sets himself against his clients, even if it is in their own interest. In fact I 
never held the necessary consultations with the child's parents without feeling 
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This older child "knows" that he needs help and, in particular, 
that he needs release from an environment that makes intolerable 
demands on him; yet he cannot consciously acknowledge his need for 
help because the psychic cost of admitting the shortcomings of his en-
vironment, and the hurtfulness of his parents toward him, seems 
devastating. To give this child clear, unambiguous power to resist 
state intervention-a power that the right against self-incrimination 
is intended to confer-is often virtually to assure that neither he nor 
anyone else will be able to acknowledge his need for help. To give 
this child such power may be to abandon him to a fate that neither 
he nor the community wants. For this child, delinquency proceedings 
are as much a contest between his parents and state agencies-how-
ever muted and disguised that contest may appear for an older child 
himself accused of bad conduct-as are child abuse and neglect 
proceedings for younger children. This older child is as little able 
effectively to protect himself against either his parents or the state 
as is the younger .101 
This characterization does not apply to all juvenile delinquency 
proceedings. Before Gault, state agencies acted as if this were a uni-
versal description. Gault argued, however, that the criminal analogue 
was so close, and the promise of benefit so uncertain, that certain 
constitutional guarantees must be applied to delinquency proceed-
ings as if children were adults. But if, in a rough way, this was 
Gault's instruction, the instruction is elusively oracular; for, even 
when dealing with adults, the state has reserved much power to 
coerce an adult for his "best interest" and to withhold constitutional 
protections from adults found incompetent to exercise them.108 
uneasy, and the analysis after some weeks, in spite of the best inherent conditions, 
finally came to grief on account of this unclarified relationship. 
A. FREUD, THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL TREATMENT OF CHILDREN 9-10 (1964). 
107. Jay Katz has aptly stated this concern in e.xploring the justification for in-
voluntary commitment of the "mentally ill" considered "dangerous to themselves": 
[A]nother oft-made argument ... asserts that no matter what the balance of in-
stinctual and ego forces or of libidinal and destructive superego forces or of inner 
and outer world distortions, persons should be left to pursue their own fate if they 
so "state." Such a proposition can be as destructive of human life as its opposite 
of over-readiness to hospitalize. It is more difficult to pursue a middle ground, 
which seeks to take into account the complexities of conscious and unconscious dy-
namics and at the same time attempts to keep such judgments from running wild, 
but it is true to the realities of human existence and aspirations. It is always easier 
to cut than untie Gordian Knots. Without coercion, society will abandon many 
people to their self-destructive and uncared-for fate. Such an approach is as 
insensitive as the abuse of power that leads to indefinite incarceration without 
treatment and with treatments that are of no value or ineffective or even harmful. 
Katz, The Right to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 755, 
770-71 (1969). 
108. See generally KATZ, supra note 79, at 421-784, regarding civil commitments, 
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Unless Gault means that all children must be treated like adults be-
cause all adults must henceforth be treated like adults, regardless of 
the state's view of their capacities or need for coerced assistance, the 
Gault instruction provides little clear direction. 
The technique for accommodating the competing demands of 
the criminal and civil procedural models, described earlier for child 
abuse and neglect laws, can be easily applied to justify all but one 
of the specific procedural rights conferred by Gault and its progeny. 
Just as in abuse and neglect laws, the Gault rights-appointed coun-
sel to represent the child, clear advance notice of charges, and con-
frontation of all witnesses at the delinquency hearing-are essential 
to ensure a rigorous testing of the basis of any claim for benevolent 
state intervention. The recent extension of Gault to require proof 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" in delinquency proceedings100 is simil-
arly justifiable. And, for the reasons discussed regarding abuse and 
neglect laws, it would be wrong to limit these procedural rights to 
those proceedings in which the child is charged with conduct that, 
for an adult, would be a crime. For whatever reason the state chooses 
to force assistance on an unwilling juvenile, these procedural guar-
antees are essential to assure a reasonable likelihood that the as-
serted benefit will result and thus to justify the withholding of what-
ever other "adult" criminal procedure guarantees the state might 
properly consider as obstructions to its beneficial purposes.U0 
commitments for "incompetent" or "insane" criminal defendants, and impositions of 
various forms of involuntary guardianships on adults. 
The Gault opinion suggests that juvenile court proceedings need not "conform 
with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative 
hearing." 387 U.S. at 30. But the opinion failed to explain what or why criminal safe-
guards might properly be omitted, and the general tone of the opposition suggests that 
this quoted language was seen as more a palliative to conflicting views within the Court 
or elsewhere than as an analytic necessity. The Supreme Court has recently affirmed 
the proposition that juvenile courts are not constitutionally compelled to apply all 
adult criminal procedures, but the Court offered little guidance in the application of 
that proposition. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W. 4777 (U.S. June 21, 1971), 
in which the Court held that jury trials were not constitutionally required in juvenile 
proceedings. Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion proclaimed that "the applicable due 
process standard in juvenile proceedings, as developed by Gault and Winship, is funda-
mental fairness." 39 U.S.L.W. at 4782. 
109. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
110. Most notably, the open-ended reach of juvenile court substantive jurisdiction-
over "incorrigibles," "persons in need of supervision," and so forth (see text following 
note 26 supra)-would likely be considered unconstitutionally vague if applied to adults. 
See Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 39 U.S.L.W. 4630 (U.S. June I, 1971). But these juvenile 
status designations can appropriately denote need for therapeutic intervention. And 
even if the status designations were held invalid, the special character of the state's 
interest in the juvenile offender would still likely appear in different sentencing pro-
visions applied, for example, to adult and juvenile misdemeanors. While minor property 
damage or personal injuries caused by an adult might be overlooked, the same conduct 
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However, Gault's bestowal of the right against self-incrimination 
in delinquency proceedings raises more complex questions, particu-
larly since Gault insisted that Miranda111 applied with full force to 
delinquency proceedings,112 so that the right to appointed counsel 
comes to the juvenile at his earliest contact with state authorities. 
If we ignore for the moment the likely practical consequences of 
this bestowal of the self-incrimination right, and focus rather on the 
idealized imagery that shines through the Court's opinions, it ap-
pears that the juvenile will be warned at the moment state officials 
contact him that he need not speak and that he can have appointed 
counsel. If he chooses either to remain silent or to have counsel 
present, all further private communication between the juvenile 
and court personnel will end. Moreover, the slightest hesitation by 
the juvenile in response to the Miranda warnings will be construed 
as an invocation of the rights to silence and to an attomey.113 In 
short, private conversation between the juvenile and court personnel 
about the juvenile's alleged actions will be impossible unless eagerly 
initiated by the juvenile himself. 
by a juvenile could sensibly be viewed as a dangerous harbinger requiring early, con-
centrated attention. A consistent pattern of differential dispositions between adult and 
juvenile offenders for the same offenses would not on its face be unjustifiable. 
The Court's recent refusal to extend the jury trial guarantee to juvenile proceed-
ings (McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 39 U.S.L.W. 4777 (U.S. June 21, 1971)), can be justified 
on the premise that juvenile courts, or some state agency, may continue to have com• 
pelled jurisdiction over juveniles "in need of supervision" as indicated by their conduct 
-though not criminal by adult standards-or by their parents' neglecting or abusive 
conduct toward them. There are factual predicates to this judgment of need. It may 
be that at present most juvenile court personnel are as unknowing in making this 
judgment as the general population from which juries are drawn. But a jury is less 
likely than juvenile court personnel to be readily or efficiently educable regarding 
application of the diagnostic criteria relevant to establishing such need. Unless the 
Court is prepared to force abandonment of juvenile "status jurisdiction," it should 
not force juries into this diagnostic process at the option of the juvenile or his parent. 
And a court should not constitutionally compel abandonment of juvenile "status 
jurisdiction" unless it is prepared to conclude that the juvenile court process is beyond 
education, or that the risks of harm from relying on future educability outweigh the 
risks of harm to children whose need for compelled state help can only be identified 
by the application of these generalized diagnostic formulations. The case for either 
of these propositions is at least disputable. 
It might nonetheless be argued that the jury right should apply when, as on the 
facts of McKeiver, a juvenile is charged with acts which would be an adult criminal 
offense. The argument has its attractions. But, again, if the parallel open-textured 
jurisdiction over "self-harmfnl" conduct, or parent neglect which may partly be made 
evident by delinquent "acting-out" conduct, is not abolished, the jury right will be 
easily side-stepped in practice unless it is extended to all aspects of juvenile court 
jurisdiction. Yet such extension seems more likely to impede than to improve sensible, 
reliable application of the juvenile court's "status jurisdictions." 
111. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
112. 387 U.S. at 44, 55. 
113. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966). 
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If this image were the practical reality, it would obviously be 
impossible for the state to make contact with, and effectively to of-
fer assistance to, that class of juveniles described earlier as lacking 
the capacity for exercising the right against self-incrimination. The 
inability of these juveniles to acknowledge their need for release 
from their present environment and their incapacity to ask for help 
by "choosing to confess" can only be remedied by confidential, 
confidence-giving, prodding and thus subtly coercive conversation 
with empathetic, well-trained court personnel.114 Conferring the 
self-incrimination right can mean that these juveniles will be lost 
to whatever help the state might offer, just as applying the self-
incrimination right in child abuse and neglect proceedings would 
make it prohibitively difficult to develop information by which the 
child's need for protection there could be identified. 
There is, however, this distinction between delinquency and 
other child-protective proceedings. Unwanted resistances to coop-
eration, which might be overcome by withholding the self-incrim-
ination right, are not apparently common to all juvenile cases; nor 
are such resistances necessarily an absolute bar to state intervention 
because of the possibility of other proof sources. By contrast, grant-
ing the self-incrimination right to parents and children in abuse 
and neglect proceedings would more likely be an end to most pro-
ceedings. 
Nevertheless, the fact remains that some juveniles are likely to 
be made inaccessible to assistance by Gault's grant of the self-in-
crimination right. On what basis did the Gault Court override a 
contrary legislative judgment that it was more important to have 
access to these juveniles, who could benefit from this protection, 
than to give the self-incrimination right to other juveniles who 
might benefit from that protection? 
Gault appears to adopt three arguments: first, little benefit is 
in fact likely to come to any juvenile from the staff and facilities 
currently available to state agencies; second, privately induced con-
fessions are likely to be anti-therapeutic when followed by coercive 
sanctions; and third, many juvenile "confessions" are in fact unre-
liable.115 The Court's second argument has particular strength; while 
114. See generally Schafer, Generative Empathy in the Treatment Situation, 28 
PsYCHOANAL\'TIC Q. 342 (1959). Commenting on the treatment strategy described by 
August Aichhom in WAYWARD Yourn (1951), Schafer notes that Aichhom "provides a 
model for identification and ego identity formation that is a way out for an adolescent 
boy caught in vacillations between extremes of behavior on the part of his parents." 
Id. at 367. See note 106 supra. 
115. See 387 U.S. at 21-23, 51-55. 
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it is true that granting power to youths to forestall state interven-
tion can disable many of them from asking the help they need, it 
is also true that withholding such power can be equally destructive 
of therapeutic goals.116 If help is seen as merely forced, rather than 
asked and needed, the coerced youth is likely to lock himself into 
a power struggle with yet another hostile environment. The known 
therapeutic techniques for changing self-destructive delinquent be-
havior cannot succeed unless the active collaboration and coopera-
tion of the youth himself is enlisted.117 Thus, if the Court wants 
to assure that the reality of therapeutic benefit matches its promise 
in juvenile dispositions, its most reliable indicator is the juvenile's 
willingness to accept the offered treatment. Guaranteeing the right 
against self-incrimination can effectively serve this end. 
But, however correct the Court's arguments may be, those argu-
ments do not require imposing the formal imagery of the self-incrim-
ination right in order to keep court personnel always at arms' 
length from an alleged delinquent juvenile. A more finely tuned 
adjustment of the competing goals could be made by permitting 
early and extensive staff access to the juvenile while greatly restrict-
ing subsequent uses of the "fruit" of that early access. This alter-
native formulation is not necessarily inconsistent with Gault. It is 
not, however, clearly envisioned or invited by the Court, but in-
stead is discouraged. Under Gault, court personnel could refuse to 
permit a juvenile access to an attorney, and question him at length, 
116. On this issue, the Gault Court stated: 
It is ... urged ... that the juvenile and presumably his parents should not be 
advised of the juvenile's right to silence because confession is good for the child as 
the commencement of the assumed therapy of the juvenile court process, and he 
should be encouraged to assume an attitude of trust and confidence toward the 
officials of the juvenile process. This proposition has been subjected to widespread 
challenge on the basis of current reappraisals of the rhetoric and realities of the 
handling of juvenile offenders. 
In fact, evidence is accumulating that confessions by juveniles do not aid in "indi-
vidualized treatment," . . . and that compelling the child to answer questions, 
without warning or advice as to his right to remain silent, does not serve this or 
any other good purpose. In light of the observations of [social scientists], it seems 
probable that where children are induced to confess by "patemal" urgings on the 
part of officials and the confession is then followed by disciplinary action, the child's 
reaction is likely to be hostile and adverse-the child may well feel that he has 
been led or tricked into confession and that despite his confession, he is being 
punished. 
387 U.S. at 51-52. 
117. Any comprehensive treatment plan to be effective requires a degree of coopera-
tion by the patient .... Almost any form of conventional psychotherapy is ex-
tremely difficult to administer without cooperation, and it may be said in general 
that the effectiveness of the psychotherapies is proportional to the degree of coopera-
tion that is present .... 
Council of the American Psychiatric Assn., Position Statement on the Question of Ade-
quacy of Treatment, 123 A.1.r. J. PSYCHIATRY 1458, 1459 (1967). See also Katz, The Right 
to Treatment-An Enchanting Legal Fiction?, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 755, 772-73 (1969). 
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as long as they were willing to be disabled by the exclusionary rule 
from later using any information thus gathered to impose an un-
wanted disposition on the juvenile. The dogma of the exclusionary 
rule is such, however, that no self-respecting court official could 
admit to using it in this way. The exclusionary rule is supposed 
to operate as an incentive to "do good"; and "good" for the Gault 
Court appears to require that court officials not have easy access to 
uncounselled juveniles. 
The Court should have attempted to apply the self-incrimination 
guarantee to juvenile court proceedings in a way that would not have 
disabled court personnel from exerting pressure on a juvenile who 
could not otherwise be helped, and yet would have forestalled the 
abuses to which any such easy access might readily lead. The tech-
nique for reaching such an accommodation was obviously at hand, 
if the Court had simply viewed the exclusionary rule as granting 
permission to deny the right to silence and to counsel, rather than 
as a device to ensure that these rights were never denied. In this 
way, the Gault Court could have acknowledged the quite legitimate 
state interest in securing confidential access to juveniles in order 
to persuade them to accept treatment, while it also protected the 
countervailing interest of the resisting juvenile by ensuring that, if 
state persuasion failed, the information gathered during the confi-
dential interviews could not be used to coerce the juvenile into an 
undesired treatment. If the process of state persuasion fails, that in 
itself is a reliable indication that little good is likely to come to the 
juvenile from state intervention (though punitive intervention to 
protect the community may still be warranted). But if, as is the case 
under Gault, the state is deprived of an easy and openly acknowl-
edged opportunity to persuade the juvenile to accept treatment, we 
cannot be certain that all who might benefit from whatever thera-
peutic treatment is available will in fact be identified. It is clear, as 
Gault posits, that the state and many juveniles are likely adversaries 
in delinquency proceedings. It is not clear that all juveniles must 
be so regarded from the beginning of their encounter with the 
state.118 
ll8. An analogous problem is presented in the operation of the Maryland Defective 
Delinquent Act, recently considered by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Tippett v. Maryland, No. 13,415 (4th Cir., Jan. 4, 1971). Under this Act, convicted 
criminal defendants already sentenced to prison terms could be judged "defective delin-
quents" and consequently indefinitely confined in a special state institution. The Act on 
its face envisioned that this referral institution would offer a broad range of rehabilita-
tive services, not available in ordinary prisons, that would be intensively applied to those 
convicted criminals regarded as particularly "dangerous." See N. MORRIS & G. HAWKINS, 
supra note 5, at 192-200, on the rationale for providing special institutionalization with 
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The exclusionary rule, by demanding suppression of all "fruits 
of the poisonous tree," can operate so that the state is unlikely to 
have any coercive hold on a juvenile who is confidentially ques-
tioned and who later refuses cooperation.119 State officials would 
most likely be unwilling to run this risk for those juveniles who have 
intensive therapy for "dangerous" criminals. In Tippett, the Act was challenged on a 
number of constitutional grounds, none of which were persuasive to a majority of the 
court. 
One issue has particular relevance here. Some plaintiffs in Tippett had been referred 
for psychological diagnosis under the Act, but they refused to speak to any of the 
diagnostic personnel at the institution. As a consequence, the diagnostic personnel con-
sidered that they could not make any judgment regarding these plaintiffs' need for 
treatment as "defective delinquents," and these plaintiffs were retained in the receiving 
ward of the institution. One of the plaintiffs had been so retained for more than four 
years, though none of them had been confined beyond the expiry date of his original 
criminal sentence. 
These plaintiffs argued that their rights against self-incrimination were being in-
fringed, and that upon refusal to submit to interviews they should be immediately re-
turned to their referring institutions. The majority dismissed their claim by a labeling 
game: "[T]he denomination of the proceedings as civil rather than criminal . • • is a 
factual description of what occurs." Slip op. at 9. Judge Sobeloff, in a separate opinion, 
agreed that plaintiffs' self-incrimination rights were not abridged, "not on the as-
serted ground that the Act is 'civil' but that, because of the unusual nature of the 
necessary inquiries, the legitimate objectives of the legislation would be frustrated 
were inmates permitted to refuse cooperation." Slip op. at 24. He refused, however, 
to endorse the state's claim that "an inmate's persistent refusal to be examined could 
indefinitely postpone any judicial hearing, and result in confinement for the rest of 
his life." Slip op. at 21, 22 n.5. 
Judge Sobeloff's approach would permit the treatment institution to focus its re-
sources on a convicted criminal in an effort to convince him that it could offer some 
useful treatment. Were the inmate able to invoke self-incrimination rights at his ini-
tial contact with institution personnel, the opportunity for them to overcome both 
realistic and fantasy-based resistances would vanish. But unless some limit were im-
posed on this process, it would merely provide lifetime confinement with no pretense 
of treatment for those uncooperative prisoners. By permitting self-incrimination rights, 
in effect, to reappear at the expiry of the original criminal sentence, however, a 
tolerable limit is placed on the process. If the inmate remains silently uncooperative, 
the treatment personnel have failed in that persuasive task that is the necessary 
prerequisite to any successful treatment. (It is of course true that parole possibilities 
for these mute inmates would be forfeited during their diagnostic detention, but 
since they were originally referred for diagnosis because they were seen as specially 
dangerous, it appears unlikely that parole would be awarded in any event before full 
expiry of their sentences.) 
This handling of the self-incrimination right would in many cases furnish a useful 
guide for courts in determining the reality of the promise of treatment under the 
Act. As stated in note 117 supra, the psychotherapeutic treatment offered under this 
Act could only succeed if the treatment personnel secured the cooperation of the in-
mate. But, by withholding his cooperation generally, the inmate could secure his re-
lease at the end of his criminal sentence. His release would be assured only if the 
courts also held that any determination under the Act that an inmate needs special 
therapy must be based on intensive psychiatric and psychological diagnostic inter-
views. This result can readily be reached by imposing a high-that is, a "criminal" 
-standard of proof in the defective delinquency proceedings. Such imposition is 
justified for the reasons discussed generally in this Article by the "hybrid" character 
of these proceedings. 
119. See generally Pitier, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shep-
ardized, 56 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 579 (1968). 
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allegedly committed offenses that are gravely injurious to others or 
greatly offensive to the community. But for such juveniles, court offi-
cials would be free, under the more permissive reading of the Gault 
exclusionary rule suggested here, to forego their option for confi-
dential persuasion and to deal with the juvenile at arms' length 
from their first encounter. The confidential-persuasion option would 
most likely be exercised in those cases in which it is not clearly es-
sential for community safety that the juvenile be detained against 
his will. Casual "joy-riding" car theft, minor narcotics offenses, 
petty property thefts, or minor assaults among acquaintances are 
likely examples of such cases, in addition to such noncriminal of-
fenses as truancy or "being habitually beyond parental control." 
Such matters are the great bulk of the jurisdiction of juvenile courts 
in this country.120 
The practical effect of the Gault self-incrimination rule, in con-
trast to its ideal imagery, leaves much room for coercive pressure 
against the juvenile to discourage him from invoking his self-in-
crimination right. This follows from the possibility, under Miranda 
as applied to both adults and juveniles, that the right against self-
incrimination can be waived without the presence of counsel, and, 
following such waiver, any information obtained can be used in later 
proceedings.121 For adults, it seems likely that Miranda retained 
the uncounselled waiver possibility because it seemed "impractical" 
and "extreme" to eliminate it-where would enough lawyers be 
found to man police stations? Would requiring the automatic pres-
ence of counsel be popularly viewed as too drastic an innovation? For 
juveniles, it seems likely that the uncounselled waiver possibility 
was retained because, rather like Mount Everest, "it was there." But 
for both adults and juveniles, this possibility is essentially a decep-
tive disjunction between the rhetorical promise of protection for 
self-incrimination guarantees and practical reality.122 And for juve-
niles, in particular, retaining the uncounselled waiver possibility 
resounds most hollowly in the teeth of the Gault Court's arguments 
that juveniles are peculiarly vulnerable to being overborne by offi-
120. See N. MoRRIS & G. HAWKINS, supra note 5, at 148-53. MUELLER, supra note 31, 
at 13, suggests on the basis of 1965 national arrest statistics that "juveniles are most 
frequently arrested or referred to court for petty larceny, fighting, disorderly conduct, 
liquor-related offenses and conduct not in violation of the criminal law such as 
curfew violation, truancy, incorrigibility, or running away from home." 
121. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1968); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474-75 
(1966). 
122. See Note, Interrogation in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 
1519 (1967); Faculty Note, A Postscript to the Miranda Project: Interrogation of Draft 
Protesters, 77 YALE L.J. 300 (1967). 
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cial questioning and, indeed, are more likely than adults to "con-
fess" falsely.123 
The current waiver possibility in juvenile proceedings permits, 
in effect, only rapid, low-visibility coercions. The sensible benefits 
from "pressure to confess" exerted on a juvenile can be realized, 
however, only if some time can be spent in relatively relaxed con-
fidential communication in which resistances can be explored, con-
tradictions in attitudes can be identified and thought out, and 
confidence can be built. The ease with which the juvenile can later 
avoid undesired consequences by disavowing this questioning seems 
particularly useful for building necessary confidence. But Gault, by 
retaining the uncounselled waiver, preserves nothing of benefit for 
the juvenile. It only assures opportunities for abuse. Whatever its 
virtues in adult proceedings, uncounselled waiver of the self-incrim-
ination right should not have been permitted for juveniles. To para-
phrase the Court's earlier characterization of the juvenile court gen-
erally, it now seems, regarding the self-incrimination right, "that 
the child receives the worst of both worlds,''124 neither the oppor-
tunity for some to be led into acknowledging their need for help, 
nor the special solicitation for others that their lesser capacities to 
resist coercive suggestion might demand. Under the Gault exclu-
sionary rule, court officials can confidentially question; but they 
cannot do so openly, honestly, and unashamedly. By withholding 
this latter possibility, Gault overreaches its mark. 
Gault holds open the possibility for state legislatures to remedy 
the Court's failure to legitimate early confidential access to juveniles 
by court officials. State legislatures can adopt immunity statutes for 
juvenile court proceedings-as frequently has been done for adult 
criminal proceedings125-that permit court officials to require a 
juvenile to forego his rights to silence and to counsel during ques-
tioning in return for immunity from prosecution for the offense 
about which the juvenile is questioned. Although such statutes for 
juveniles might appear impolitically "soft on delinquents," they 
would be responsive to the reality that coercive sanctions against 
juveniles are unlikely to have any therapeutic benefit. Precisely 
because of the public unpopularity of this stance, however, it is 
unfortunate that the Court did not understand the need to legitimate 
123. See note 115 supra. 
124. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966). 
125. See Comment, State Immunity Statutes in Constitutional Perspective, 1968 
DUKE L.J. 311; Note, Immunity Statutes and the Constitution, 68 COLUM. L. REY. 959 
(1968). 
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such conduct by juvenile court authorities rather than to leave the 
question to state legislative action. 
IV. PROTECTING PARENTS AND CHILDREN FROM EXCESSIVE 
STATE ZEAL: WYMAN RE-EXAMINED 
In welfare administration-Wyman's context-the justification 
for coercive state intervention in order to protect children from 
their parents or from self-inflicted harm, or to protect the parents 
themselves, seems more attenuated. The fact of welfare status nec-
essarily implies that both parents and children need government 
assistance. But it is not self-evident that all welfare recipients, or 
even many of them, need more than money for assistance. The 
government cannot self-evidently claim to know, better than they, 
the needs of all or many welfare recipients. By contrast, the clear 
strength of government claims to superior knowledge on behalf 
of many children in neglect or delinquency proceedings posed a 
dilemma, discussed in earlier sections, for constitutional arguments 
to extend all criminal safeguards to those proceedings. That dilemma 
is much less evident for welfare law administration. 
It can be sensibly argued that welfare recipients do need more 
than money, and that forced home visits are a necessary technique 
to assure that these additional needs are met. But Congress has not 
clearly accepted this argument. Welfare laws do not require home 
visits to accompany welfare assistance as a matter of course. In-
stead, the state agency in Wyman had itself interpreted its mandate 
under the federal welfare legislation126 to include compulsory home 
visits as a condition of continuing eligibility for welfare assistance. 
Although federal welfare statutes generally give wide discretion to 
state agencies, nonetheless the Court in Wyman could justifiably 
have refused to resolve the constitutional arguments for or against 
the warrant requirement on the ground that home visits were not 
mandated by the statute as an eligibility condition. The Court's 
refusal to read the statute in this manner, despite Justice Marshall's 
dissent, which in effect urged this result, 127 is further indication of 
its willingness to accept at face value the state's assurances that 
beneficial purposes were served by the home visit and its unwilling-
ness to give any substantial weight to Mrs. James' various claims 
for freedom from government intrusion. Ultimately, the Court may 
be correct in rejecting Mrs. James' constitutional claims for a war-
126. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-10 (Supp. IV, 1965-1969). 
127. 400 U.S. at 345-47. 
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rant requirement. But it cannot be correct in denying the substan-
tiality of those claims, and in refusing to avoid overriding her 
claims unless it were clearly necessary to do so. 
But the Court assumed-and we must accept that assumption 
for purposes of evaluating the Court's application of constitutional 
doctrine-that a legislative, or a legislatively authorized, judgment 
had been made that welfare recipients needed services in addi-
tion to funds, and that a coerced home visit would ensure accep-
tance of those services by the recipient or for her children. Accepting 
this judgment as reasonable-as it assuredly is-it nevertheless does 
not follow that a warrant requirement should not be constitution-
ally imposed. 
The beneficent purposes of this compulsory visit--either on be-
half of the resisting parent or her child--do not necessarily establish 
the inapplicability of the fourth amendment search warrant require-
ment. The Court in its earlier decision in Camara v. Municipal 
Court,128 requiring warrants for housing code inspections, had clearly 
held that the fourth amendment guarantees reached beyond searches 
whose purpose was to collect evidence of criminal violations. As 
Justice Marshall stated in his Wyman dissent, the housing code pro-
gram in Camara was potentially beneficial for the inspected home-
mvner as well as for his neighbors, who were necessarily affected by 
the condition of his house. Camara cannot be distinguished on this 
ground from the welfare home visit. Nor can Camara be convinc-
ingly distinguished from Wyman on the ground that the sanction 
available for refusal to permit housing inspector access, though 
formally labeled a "criminal" penalty, was more onerous than the 
total loss of support threatened in Wyman.120 To distinguish Camara 
on this ground is to embrace a jurisprudence of labels. 
Even ignoring the precedential value of Camara, the Court 
should have construed its mandate under the fourth amendment 
to extend to such a case as Wyman. Constitutional text only infre-
quently yields self-evident applications. But the language of the 
fourth amendment-that "the right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . ,"130 on its face 
belies the constricted construction made by the Wyman Court. Only 
lawyers schooled in construing the fine points of medieval forms of 
128. 887 U.S. 523 (1967). 
129. This was the Wyman Court's proffered distinction regarding Camara. 400 U.S. 
at 824-25. 
130. U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV. 
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action could be fully comfortable with the Court's conclusion that 
the caseworker visit, compelled on penalty of loss of all means of 
support, was not a "search," or with its added argument that, even 
if it were a search, the compulsory visit was so obviously "reason-
able" in its purposes that no further judicial participation in assur-
ing the continuing "reasonableness" of that search was required.131 
If a plausible argument could have been made that a warrant 
requirement would interfere with the welfare agency's ability to 
carry out its avowed beneficent purposes, the Court's action would 
have greater justification. But no such argument can be made. And 
by accepting at face value the government's argument that its 
benevolent motives justified forcing its assistance on an unwilling 
recipient, the Court misread the role that it should generally assume 
in order to tame the excesses of such well-meaning zeal. The Court 
cannot properly ban all such coercive assistance. But in order to 
protect the constitutional values, whose vindication is peculiarly 
entrusted to the Court by tradition and popular expectation, the 
Court should use its procedural weaponry to assure in some degree 
that coerced assistance is what it claims to be. Inescapably such as-
sistance will be coercive. But the Court, by mandating independent 
scrutiny of each case of coercive application, must attempt to assure 
that this assistance is more than merely coercive. The Court, that 
is, should do in welfare administration (and in such areas as child 
abuse and neglect proceedings) what it has begun to do in regulat-
ing juvenile court processes. 
But, as with juvenile court and child-protective proceedings, 
the Court must modulate its application of procedural guarantees 
to accommodate the special characteristics of welfare administration. 
The Wyman Court was correct to suggest that the government's 
benevolent purposes in welfare programs do differentiate these pro-
grams from typical, criminally sanctioned proscriptions. The Court 
must assure that the differences remain real by insisting that the 
government beneficence be clearly apparent in individual applica-
tions. But it would obviously be quixotic for the Court to demand 
assurances to such an extent that the beneficent purposes could not 
be carried out, unless the Court were willing to forbid outright any 
coercions for such ends. 
For this reason, in Camara, the Court required a search warrant 
for housing inspections but refused to apply the ordinary fourth 
amendment probable cause standard as a precondition for the war-
131. 400 U.S. at 317-18. 
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rant.132 The Camara Court concluded that some independent judi-
cial scrutiny of forced government access to inspect homes was 
necessary in order to protect individual privacy values. But because 
housing code violations typically cannot be anticipated except in a 
most general way from the age and character of the dwelling and 
the time elapsed since prior inspection, the code program would 
be disabled if a highly particularized showing of probable cause 
to suspect a violation were required before any inspection could 
proceed. 
It is, of course, equally true that many criminal prosecutions, 
particularly for victimless crimes or highly organized criminal ac-
tivity, are disabled by the probable cause standard. The Camara 
Court might thus have argued that the purposes of housing code 
inspection were no more socially important than the purposes of 
such criminal investigations. But the Court properly saw a differ-
ence, derived both from the plausible promise of benefit to the 
inspected homeowner's health and safety and from the close inter-
dependence of the health and safety of neighboring homes. Thus, 
to vindicate the claimed rights of a home occupant resisting inspec-
tion would directly and immediately threaten to derogate the 
legitimate interests of identifiable people. For criminal investiga-
tions, particularly those carried out following commission of the 
crime, there is typically no such countervailing interest at stak.e.133 
And though the criminal, once caught, might well be benefited by 
rehabilitative services, that promise is obviously less believable than 
the promise of assistance that accompanies housing code inspec-
tions.134 Thus, the Camara Court required a showing only of "rea-
sonable grounds" for the inspection, rather than "probable cause." 
The Court further made clear that a housing inspector could show 
that a particular house was simply part of a general area that was 
132. 387 U.S. at 534-39. 
133. Even in a clearly criminal law enforcement context, the Supreme Court has 
permitted a policeman to protect his immediate safety by searching a person for 
dangerous weapons, although that person was stopped by the policeman without prior 
probable cause to suspect a violation and although there was no probable cause to 
believe that the person was carrying a weapon. Rather, throughout its analysis, the 
Court tested the policeman's conduct by a lesser "reasonableness" standard. Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
134. "Fire inspectors give frequent advice concerning fire prevention, wiring ca-
pacity, and other matters, and obvious self-interest causes many to welcome the fire 
or safety inspection." Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 340 O"ustice Marshall, dissenting). 
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being inspected, and this fact would ordinarily constitute sufficient 
"reasonable grounds" to support a warrant.135 
If a warrant requirement had been imposed in Wyman, for one 
limited purpose the Court similarly should have required a show-
ing of "reasonable grounds" rather than "probable cause." The 
Wyman Court was willing to credit three purposes for the welfare 
home visit: to provide rehabilitative services for the welfare mother; 
to provide services for, and offer general protection to, the welfare 
child; and "to know how [the government's] charitable funds are 
utilized and put to work"136-that is, to investigate for misuse or 
improper receipt of funds. But, as has been noted earlier,137 when 
the welfare mother refuses to accept the visit, it is difficult to imag-
ine rehabilitative services for her that might sensibly be forced 
on her by a coerced visit. That alleged purpose for a coerced visit 
would hardly constitute even a "reasonable ground," much less 
"probable cause," for issuing a warrant. 
A home visit has obvious utility for investigating misuse of 
funds. But it is not clear that the "probable cause" standard should 
be displaced for this purpose alone. The Wyman Court argued that 
this investigative purpose was essentially similar to that justifying 
the rule in income tax: audits requiring disallowance of a claimed 
tax benefit unless "[t]he tax.payer produce[s] for the agent's review 
some proof of a deduction the tax.payer has asserted to his bene-
fit."138 Justice Marshall in dissent argued that the analogy was 
inapplicable because tax audits did not require home searches.139 
The fourth amendment does not on its face distinguish between 
searches of "persons, houses, papers and effects." But the good sense 
of Justice Marshall's objection is that welfare recipients as a class 
are more vulnerable to government overreaching than are taxpayers. 
In addition, the availability of this general "search power" for tax 
auditors will work only sporadic and relatively limited intrusions 
in matters that taxpayers might wish to withhold, in contrast to 
the continual, relatively wide-ranging intrusions resulting from the 
welfare-visit requirement. This difference does not establish that 
the welfare-visit requirement is impermissible, but rather that it, 
more than tax audits, requires judicial scrutiny in individual cases 
135. 387 U.S. at 535-38. 
136. 400 U.S. at 318-19. 
137. See te.xt accompanying note 16 supra. 
138. 400 U.S. at 324. 
139. 400 U.S. at 343. 
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to vindicate important privacy values common to both contexts. 
But, however close the taxpayer analogy might be to welfare laws, 
once that analogy is rejected and a warrant requirement is estab-
lished, there seems little reason to withhold the full rigor of the 
warrant protection. Thus a showing of "probable cause" should 
be required for the warrant to issue when the sole purpose of the 
visit is to investigate a potential misuse of funds. 
Only when the alleged purpose of the coerced visit is to provide 
services or protection for the child does a compelling case appear 
for adopting, as did Camara, the "reasonable grounds" standard to 
govern issuance of the warrant. When applied to a visit for this 
purpose, a "probable cause" standard would restrict investigation 
as sharply, and as much to the detriment of children, as would 
application of this standard to preliminary examinations in child 
abuse and neglect proceedings.140 Relations between parents and, 
in particular, preschool children have too little ready visibility to 
expect that children can be adequately protected by generally re-
quiring a "probable cause" showing of imminent injury before 
state authorities can examine children or their parents against the 
parents' will. Under this lesser "reasonable grounds" standard, the 
need for a visit in the home to see the child might not readily be 
established, but justification could be found for examining the child 
and parent somewhere on a regular basis. This justification seems 
particularly available in Wyman in view of the history of Maurice 
James' injuries noted by the Court from Mrs. James' welfare file.141 
This argument for a lesser proof standard for state child-protec-
tive purposes is not derived from anything peculiar to the welfare 
program. Rather it is drawn from considering the needs of state 
child-protective programs generally. Child-protective programs are, 
however, most rigorously carried out against welfare recipients. Thus 
a rule that generally permits easy state investigation of parent-child 
relationships will fall with particular force on welfare families. There 
is some slight reason to believe that welfare families as a group, 
for whatever cause, are more likely than other families to warrant 
state intervention to protect young children.142 But this evidence 
140. See text accompanying note 84 supra. 
141. See text accompanying note 18 supra. 
142. A thorough statistical analysis of all child abuse cases reported, pursuant to 
generally prevailing mandatory reporting statutes, in the United States during 1967 
and 1968 has recently been completed. D. GIL, supra note 48. Gil found, in analyzing 
a representative sample of these cases, that "families with a low socio-economic back-
ground were overrepresented [as compared to their relative proportion of the popula• 
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is not strong enough to establish compellingly persuasive differences 
between welfare and other families. The state would not be able 
to satisfy a substantial burden of proof in order to justify concen-
trating its child-protective investigators on welfare families, if such 
a showing were required. 
But would a court be justified in imposing such a proof burden 
in this matter? The consequences of this burden would be that the 
state could avoid a "probable cause" showing for child-protective 
tion] ••• especially among the nonwhite families. Notable trends concerning family 
structure seem to be a high proportion of households headed by females, an even 
higher proportion of absence of biological father, and a higher than average birth· 
rate." Id. at 114. 
Gil also found that both present and past welfare status families were overrepre• 
sented among those families reported for child abuse. He states 
[A]t the time of the abusive incident, 34.1 percent of all families were receiving 
AFDC grants and 3.1 percent were receiving other public-assistance grants. Thus 
nearly 4 in IO families were on public assistance. Altogether, nearly 60 percent of 
the families had received aid from public assistance agencies during or prior to 
the study year. 
Analysis of the public assistance status of families from different ethnic groups 
in the sample cohort reveals that 46.3 percent Negro families and 61.3 percent 
Puerto Rican families, as against 17.6 percent white families, were recipients of 
AFDC grants at the time of the abuse report; and over 66 percent Negro families, 
70 percent Puerto Rican families, and 40.3 percent white families had received 
some form of assistance during or prior to the study year. 
Id. at 112. 
There is an obvious likelihood of bias regarding low-income families in the opera-
tion of any child abuse reporting statute. Well-to-do families have greater means for 
avoiding reports. One indication of this fact appears in the figures regarding report-
ing sources. Of all abuse cases reported, 51.8% came from "medical resources," but 
of that figure private doctors were an insignificant number. Of all cases reported, 
49.0% came from "hospitals or clinics" where the poor are more likely to go, and 
less likely to be deferentially regarded. Only 2,8% of all reports came from "private 
medical doctors." Id. at 123. 
But not all "low socio-economic status" families are or have been recipients of 
public welfare. It may thus be significant that welfare status families were also over-
represented among those reported for child abuse. This fact must also be viewed 
with considerable caution, since welfare families are uniquely subject to caseworker 
scrutiny. Nonetheless, a significant number of the reported families were past welfare 
recipients at the time of the abusive incident and presumably were not then under 
any general surveillance by welfare officials. 
These statistical links are so tenuous-and the total number of child abuse cases 
reported so small as compared to the total number of AFDC families in the country 
-that one might dismiss out of hand the proposition that welfare status has any 
correlative significance with the likelihood of child abuse. (Gil reports that in 1967, 
9563 child abuse cases were reported in the United States, of which 5993 could 
be substantiated. In 1968, there were 10,931 reports, of which 6617 were substan-
tiated. Id. at 93. By contrast, 738,000 children received "child welfare services from 
State and local public welfare agencies" in 1968. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &: 
WELFARE, CmLD WELFARE STA115IICS 12 (1969)). Nonetheless, for some families welfare 
status is itself an indication of social disorganization, and that disorganization could 
have persuasive parallels to the pathology of child abusing families, as some com-
mentators have described them. While acknowledging the reporting bias for "the 
poor and nonwhites," Gil suggests "nevertheless, that life in poverty and in the ghettos 
generates stressful experiences, which are likely to become precipitating factors of 
child abuse •••• " Id. at 138-39. 
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investigations only when its investigations were randomly distrib-
uted throughout its population or, of course, when they covered 
all the population. The predictive tools for identifying children 
in need of protection from their parents for whatever reason are 
utterly inadequate to yield compelling justifications for preselect-
ing any segment of the population for special attention.143 It might 
be argued that a court demand for such perfection would in fact 
not interfere with any legitimate state purpose on the ground that 
any deployment of the state's child-protective investigators is essen-
tially random, whether focused on welfare families or elsewhere, 
and thus the same number of children needing protection is likely 
to be found wherever state investigators look. But this argument 
ignores the fact that there is already a welfare bureaucracy staffed 
with investigators who have regular contact for many purposes with 
an identifiable clientele. This investigative staff cannot be diverted 
to random checks of all families for child-protective purposes. If a 
court were to require such "randomization" as the price for avoiding 
a "probable cause" barrier, the option would not likely be pursued 
by any state agency. Thus there would be a net loss of children in 
need of care who would otherwise be found. 
All of those "lost" children would be from welfare families. But 
it is not clear that the interests of welfare recipients generally in 
resisting empirically poorly supported and, to some degree, stigma-
tizing state identification as peculiarly "child neglect-prone" should 
outweigh the interests of those needy children among them in secur-
ing protection from harmful parents. The interests here of both 
welfare recipients and needy welfare children are substantial and 
are in conflict. The Wyman Court simply ignored the parents' in-
terests and opted for the interests of the children. A more persuasive 
resolution here-as elsewhere in the matters discussed by this Article 
-is to mediate the conflicting interests. Thus a warrant require-
ment should be imposed, but it should be applied with a relatively 
permissive standard. 
Just as the home occupant in Camara could not successfully re-
sist a warrant on the ground that some other area of the city needed 
inspection as much as, or more than, his area, so it should not be 
sufficient in the welfare context to allege that other groups of parents 
and children are equally logical targets for child-protective searches. 
But, again as in Camara, the state official seeking a warrant would 
143. See D, Gu., supra note 48, at 18-48, 125-32, 
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be required to show that his child-protective searches were related 
to a coherent policy followed by his agency, and were not merely, 
for example, an excuse for harassing a particular unpopular welfare 
recipient.144 And the state official would have to show some reason 
that each specific objection to the child-protective search raised by 
the welfare recipient in each individual case should be overridden 
by the court. 
I£ Wyman had applied a warrant requirement for welfare 
searches, the Court would have had to consider a further question. 
For the same reason that uncounselled waivers of the self-incrim-
ination right were rejected in the earlier discussion of juvenile pro-
ceedings,145 it could be argued that all welfare home visits should 
be based on warrants. Such a rule would respond to the obvious 
fragility of the privacy interest in welfare administration. Welfare 
recipients' utter dependence on public funds and their continuing 
relationship with their caseworker make it unlikely, in most cases, 
that they will dare to challenge a requested home visit.146 The re-
quest for permission to enter might thus in itself be seen as unduly 
coercive. 
There is, however, an important reason for retaining the waiver 
possibility for welfare recipients. If a court were required to decide 
whether a warrant should be issued without any indication of indi-
vidual resistance to a particular search, it could effectively do 
nothing but issue warrants in blank. All welfare recipients would 
be, by hypothesis, in need of "rehabilitative services" to assist them 
in leaving welfare status. Thus, it is implausible to imagine that 
a court, when asked generally for home-visit permissions, would 
ever conclude that a state agency had no capacity whatever to pro-
vide rehabilitative services. The recipient's refusal to accept the 
visit is the first and necessary step in forcing the welfare agency to 
define and justify with some precision its actions in "coercing assis-
tance." Only in a dispute between a caseworker who wants entry and 
a recipient who refuses it, can the court confidently assert, for exam-
ple, that there is no "rehabilitative purpose," at least for the welfare 
parent who will be served by this particular visit. 
The Supreme Court should have required precise definition and 
justification to force substantiation of the benevolent conceits of the 
144. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 532-33 (1967). 
145. See text accompanying note 123 supra. 
146. See Handler &: Hollingsworth, supra note 2. 
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welfare home visit at stake in Wyman. And the Court should do 
the same for all state-coerced "assistance." The basic failure in Wy-
man was that the Court neither saw the case in its broadest context 
nor understood that it must address that broadest context in order 
to advance vitally important judicial goals. Wyman does not disable 
the Court from undertaking this task in the near future. It does, 
unfortunately, intimate that a majority of the Court is unlikely to 
do so. But, to paraphrase the Talmudic lesson, if the Supreme Court 
does not speak for these values, who will? If not now, when? 
